

NATO'S AIR WAR IN LIBYA: A TEMPLATE
FOR FUTURE AMERICAN OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

TIMOTHY E BOOK, MAJOR, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
B.S., Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, 2000
M.A., Webster University, St Louis, Missouri, 2006

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2012-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 08-06-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2011 – JUN 2012	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE NATO'S Air War in Libya: A Template for Future American Operations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Timothy E. Book, Major				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT America's recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq proved that it is easier to get into war than it is to get out of it. These two conflicts bleed America, in terms of not only blood, but also its financial treasures. In an attempt to avoid these expenses in the future, this paper explores if there is a better way to achieve our nation's policy objectives. This research paper attempts to answer the question: does NATO's air war in Libya provide a template for how the United States will settle its future military conflicts? This paper explores three case studies involving airpower to identify the feasibility of a template for future military operations. The first case study explores NATO's 78-day air war against Bosnia over Kosovo. The next case study looks at America's involvement in Afghanistan during the first six months of Operation Enduring Freedom. The last case study involves NATO and America's 2011 involvement in Libya. From these case studies emerges a template that consists of three broad requirements necessary for the Limited Boots on Ground (LBoG) model to work. Finally, this paper discusses four disadvantages of the LBoG model followed by four advantages of the LBoG model.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Libya, Operation Unified Protector, Operation Odyssey Dawn, Air Power, Afgan Model, Limited Boots On Ground (LBoG) Model					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	91	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Timothy E. Book

Thesis Title: NATO'S Air War In Libya: A Template for Future American Operations

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Timothy R. Hentschel, Ph.D.

_____, Member
David P. Goebel, M.A.

_____, Member
Lt Col Randy A. Nash, B.S.

Accepted this 8th day of June 2012 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

NATO'S AIR WAR IN LIBYA: A TEMPLATE FOR FUTURE AMERICAN OPERATIONS, by Major Timothy E. Book, 91 pages.

America's recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq proved that it is easier to get into war than it is to get out of it. These two conflicts bleed America, in terms of not only blood, but also its financial treasures. In an attempt to avoid these expenses in the future, this paper explores if there is a better way to achieve our nation's policy objectives. This research paper attempts to answer the question: does NATO's air war in Libya provide a template for how the United States will settle its future military conflicts? This paper explores three case studies involving airpower to identify the feasibility of a template for future military operations. The first case study explores NATO's 78-day air war against Bosnia over Kosovo. The next case study looks at America's involvement in Afghanistan during the first six months of Operation Enduring Freedom. The last case study involves NATO and America's 2011 involvement in Libya. From these case studies emerges a template that consists of three broad requirements necessary for the Limited Boots on Ground (LBoG) model to work. Finally, this paper discusses four disadvantages of the LBoG model followed by four advantages of the LBoG model.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the research committee chaired by Dr. Timothy Hentschel, members Mr. David Goebel and Lt Col Randy Nash. These men were instrumental in providing direction and insight in the construction of this paper. I would also like to extend thanks to my seminar leader Mr. George Chandler and the MMAS staff group members who provided motivation and guidance that help me complete this paper. I would be remiss if I did not recognized Mr. Rusty Rafferty at the research department at the Combined Arms Research Library. Rusty was enormously helpful with accessing information and provided me with high quality research that added value to the paper. Ms. Venita Krueger assisted me in putting the finishing formatting touches on this paper.

To my former Squadron Commanders, Col Roberts, Col Jensen, Col Misner and Lt Col Krishna, thank you for the lessons in leadership and mentoring that allowed me the opportunity to attend this school. I would also like to extend thanks to the Army Command and General Staff College for the excellent instruction I received this past year.

To my wife Julie, I could not have completed this project without your support. Thanks for taking care of Little John while I spent countless hours locked up in the office. I love you and Little John. Thanks for supporting me during not only this research project but also in our journey with the Air Force.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	vii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	1
Problem Statement.....	3
Research Question	4
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	5
Introduction.....	5
Operation Allied Force	5
Afghanistan.....	10
Libya	15
CHAPTER 3 ANALYSIS	19
CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	72
Conclusions.....	72
Recommendations.....	77
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	79
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	84

ACRONYMS

IADS	Integrated Air Defense System
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LBoG	Limited Boots on Ground
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OOD	Operation Odyssey Dawn
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
PDPA	People Democratic Party of Afghanistan
SGA	Small Group Advisor
SOF	Special Operation Forces
TNC	Transitional National Council
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

If we should have to fight, we should be prepared to do so from the neck up instead of from the neck down.

— General James H. Doolittle

Returning from a 13-hour combat mission, safely flown at 30,000 feet above the fighting and killing below, the air-conditioned crew bus comes to a stop to pay its final respects for a fallen warrior movement. The ramp temperature is above 120 degrees Fahrenheit as the flag draped caskets, containing the cold lifeless bodies of the sons and daughters of America, slowly move towards a C-17 cargo airplane for their long final flight back home. This process is respectful, seamless and surprisingly short, as the wars have provided those performing this ceremony with much practice. Those fallen warriors inside those metal caskets died for their country. It is our duty as civilian and military leaders to make sure they did not die because we are fighting an outdated way of war.

Since it is our duty to ensure we are not needlessly sacrificing our nation's treasures of blood and currency it is appropriate and necessary to examine the way we wage war. For example, as of February 28, 2012 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have killed 6,383 United States service members and wounded an additional 47,638 men and women of the United States military.¹ Congressional Research Services reports the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with enhanced homeland security has costs taxpayers

¹U.S. Department of Defense, "Defense New Casualty Report," <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2012).

\$1.283 trillion through 2011.² In June 2011, a nonpartisan investigation by Brown University's, Watson Institute for International Studies, put the cost of wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistani at \$4 trillion and resulting in 225,000 military and civilian deaths.³ Compare these numbers to recent operations in Libya, which only cost the United States \$869 million and no military casualties.⁴ These stark comparisons bring to question if NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) will provide United States policy makers valid military options for future conflicts. With that being said, the purpose of this research paper is to examine if OUP in Libya will provided a template for how the United States will settle the preponderance of future military operations.

Winds of change blew across many Arab countries this spring including Egypt, Tunisia and eventually Libya. These winds of change were to some extent peaceful in Egypt and Tunisia; this would not be the case in Libya. Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, who was launched into power after a military coup in 1969, would not go without a fight.⁵ Fueled by the Arab Spring movement, protesters in the city of Benghazi felt the

²Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2011).

³Eisenhower Study Group, "The Costs of War Since 2001: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan" (Research Project, Brown University, Providence, RI, June 2011), <http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/Costs%20of%20War%20Executive%20Summary.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2011).

⁴Devin Dwyer, "US Military Intervention in Libya Cost at Least \$896 Million," *ABC News*, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/08/us-military-intervention-in-libya-cost-at-least-896-million/> (accessed September 25, 2011).

⁵David S. Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 384.

wrath of Qadhafi's forces on 17-19 February when they killed more than 100 protesters.⁶ On 17 March 2011, the United Nation's Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force by "all necessary means" to protect civilians.⁷ After the passage of UN Resolution 1973, Colonel Gaddafi said, "his troops were coming tonight and there would be no mercy," for the residence of Benghazi.⁸

The United States and Britain fired more than 110 cruise missiles at Libya on March 19, while French fighter jets attacked ground targets.⁹ These and subsequent NATO led attacks would end up saving Benghazi from massive ground attacks from Gaddafi's forces. The Arab Spring spread across the summer in Libya and resulted in the fall of Tripoli and the Gaddafi regime.

Problem Statement

Prolonged large ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have depleted the United States of both blood and treasure. These complex missions have tasked the nation's warriors to perform combat and stability operations simultaneously; something that the U.S. military had to learn via on the job training. Meanwhile, many of those who live in these countries view American operations not as peacekeeping and nation

⁶Paul Schemm, "Battle at Army Base Broke Gadhafi Hold in Benghazi," *Washington Post*, February 25, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022505021.html> (accessed September 25, 2011).

⁷BBC News Africa, "Libya: UN Backs Action Against Colonel Gaddafi," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12781009> (accessed September 25, 2011).

⁸Ibid.

⁹BBC News Africa, "Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972> (accessed September 25, 2011).

building, but rather as imperialist invaders and occupiers. In light of the United States growing national debt, the cost of waging protracted ground wars may become more detrimental to national security than the offset resulting from the reason why the nation went to war in the first place. However, OUP in Libya resulted in no American loss of life, cost the taxpayers only a fraction of the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and resulted in regime change.

Research Question

This thesis will answer the primary research question: does OUP provide a template for how the United States will settle the preponderance of future military operations?

To answer the primary research question it is necessary to answer these secondary research questions.

1. Did the strength or weakness of the Libyan military play a role in the success of OUP?
2. Will American public support limit future military operations to the OUP model?
3. Will the American national deficit force military operations to use the OUP model?
4. What pre-conditions are required before an operation such as OUP can be successfully executed?
5. How did OUP achieve success without American or foreign troops on the ground?
6. What conditions will prevent success of operations like OUP?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.
— President Barack Obama’s address to the Nation on Libya March 28, 2011

Introduction

This review will break down the literature studied into three areas: (1) Operation Allied Force (OAF), (2) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and (3) OUP. The format of this literature review explores the history of the region leading up to the conflict, a broad examination of the military operation, the lessons learned and how these lessons learned impact the research questions.

Operation Allied Force

When surveying OAF, six works provide the cornerstone of analysis used in this research. The first written by General Wesley Clark, titled *Waging Modern War*, describes the success and difficulties of OAF in 1999. General Wesley Clark, who was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander and the United States European Commander, led NATO’s OAF against Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian force in Yugoslavia. This book offers a rare insight into the challenges facing the dual hatted commander running a military campaign that relied exclusively on airpower alone. While OAF was able to achieve all of NATO’s objectives, the lessons learned are many according to General Wesley Clark.

General Clark’s book, *Waging Modern War*, highlights many issues with OAF that are relevant to this research. General Clark describes the challenges of dealing with

the eighteen NATO member nations and maintaining a unified political front while conducting combat operations. General Clark also reports that, “one of the most controversial features of the campaign was the decision at the outset to rely exclusively on airpower.”¹⁰ General Clark was a strong proponent for the planning and potential use of ground forces if air strikes failed; however, this put him at odds with the United States civilian leadership who did not want to commit ground forces. Lastly, the book exposes some of the tensions between General Clark and airpower advocates regarding the use of airpower to target strategic targets versus tactical targets.

NATO’s Air War for Kosovo by Benjamin S. Lambeth and published by RAND, provides an independent analysis of OAF for the United States Air Force. Lambeth and the RAND team did an excellent job of telling the good, the bad and the ugly of air powers role in OAF. Even though the United States Air Force funded this research, it provides an unbiased review of the history of OAF. Next, it explores why Milosevic capitulated when he did and the role air power played. It also covers the accomplishments of the war including the combat debut of the B-2 and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Finally, it explores the operational problems and lapses in strategy and implementation.

The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, written by Stephen T. Hosmer, is also published by RAND for the United States Air Force. This book, as the title explains, not only examines why Milosevic accepted NATO’s terms on June 3, 1999, but also explores why he failed to accept them before the bombing started on March 24, 1999. In part I of this book, the first three chapters provide a good

¹⁰Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 430.

background on why Milosevic was most likely unwilling to accept the initial Rambouillet Agreement.¹¹ These reasons were two fold. First, Milosevic rose to political power on the premises that Kosovo was the cradle of Serbia's identity. If Milosevic had agreed to the Rambouillet agreement, thus ending Serb control in Kosovo, it would have eroded his political power. Next, Milosevic's assumption was that NATO's air strike would be of a limited duration. This was based on his belief that NATO's alliance would not hold together for a long and ugly conflict. If he survived a short term bombing campaign, maybe Serbia could get better terms for Kosovo at the bargaining table.¹²

Part II of this book explores why Milosevic accepted NATO's agreement on June 3, 1999. First, Milosevic's assumption that NATO's alliance would crack under pressure was not true. Second, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavian forces initially rallied Serbian support for the war effort, but as the campaign raged on, the hardships at home became too much for most Serbians to accept. Third, attacks against military targets did little to influence Milosevic's decision to terminate the war. Fourth, Milosevic believed that NATO's air attacks were only going to increase in intensity if he did not accept NATO's terms. Fifth, the threat of a ground invasion, "was probably another, albeit lesser, factor in Milosevic's decision."¹³ Finally, Milosevic believed if he did not accept NATO's

¹¹The Rambouillet conference started on February 6, 1999 in the castle of Rambouillet in France with the purpose of reaching a peace agreement between the Serbs and Kosovars. The conference broke down on March 18, 1999 thus ending a diplomatic solution to conflict. Six days later OAF began. Also see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 78-79.

¹²Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2001), 7-34.

¹³*Ibid.*, xii-xix.

terms when he did, the threat of continued air attacks and warnings of a ground invasion would leave him with little or no political power.

The next book of reference, *Disjointed War* was also published by RAND but this time for the United States Army. This book explores the war in much the same light as the other RAND publications, but it does expose a somewhat different viewpoint on the operation. However, this book, like all the books reviewed for the research of OAF, lists the lack of a credible ground threat as a limiting factor in the ultimate success of the Kosovo crisis. *Disjointed War* also pointed out the fact that even if there are not large amounts of ground forces involved, there should still be a land component commander to assist with intelligence collection and to plan for a land force contingency if needed. This book also reconfirms the division between General Clark and his Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General Short over the correct application of air power. General Clark seemed to view ground forces as the center of gravity of Milosevic's power. Lieutenant General Short believed that air power could not stop the ethnic cleansing and air power should focus instead on fixed targets in Yugoslavia, especial leadership targets in Belgrade.¹⁴

Winning Ugly, written by Daalder and O'Hanlon, and published by the Brookings Institution provides a thorough review of the Kosovo conflict. *Winning Ugly*, much like the other literature on OAF, paints the previous few years leading up to the armed conflict. *Winning Ugly* also describes the shortcoming of NATO's initial air campaign in

¹⁴The disagreement over the correct center of gravity was also discussed in General Wesley Clark's book *Waging Modern War*. On page 219 of *Waging Modern War*, one can see the difficulty with collateral damage concerns of attacking Phase III targets in Belgrade. See Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 219.

which the authors titled one of the chapters, “Losing the War.” The book details how NATO was able to “Win the War” even though it was not pretty, hence the title, *Winning Ugly*. In the conclusion, the authors answer the questions of: was the war avoidable, did NATO win the war, and how did NATO win? This book also explores the implications for policy learned from OAF.

To gain a better understanding of the Kosovo conflict, this researcher found it necessary to investigate the history of the region. *Kosovo a Short History* provides the needed history to understand the conflict. Originally published in 1994, some five years before the Kosovo conflict erupted, the authored added a preface in 1999, which fills in where the original book left off. For this researcher, understanding the history of conflict over Kosovo is the foundation that one must fully appreciate before they can fully analyze OAF.

The last book reviewed for the OAF case study was, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. This book was beneficial in painting the history of the region to include the rise in power of Slobodan Milosevic. This book helped the reader understand the importance of Kosovo to Milosevic and his political career. It also provided details of the events leading up to the Rambouillet conference and those events prior to Milosevic’s decision to remove his force from Kosovo in June 1999.

Several periodicals and websites were reviewed for the study of OAF. For the history of the conflict in Kosovo, the best source studied was a declassified Congressional Research Service report on the historical background of the conflict. In this report, author Steven Woehrel provides a review of the sometimes-disputed history leading up to the tensions between Serbs and non-Serbs living in Kosovo. The *New York*

Times and *Washington Post* provide the basis for the periodical research. These articles provided a wealth of information that provides facts for the study of OAF.

The online version of *Air Force Magazine* provided several articles about OAF. While the *Air Force Magazine* is a good source of information, this researcher found some of these articles biased towards the Air Force. This researcher used facts from these articles to build the OAF case study. The Air Forces Historical Studies Office published a history fact sheet for the 1999 OAF operation. This fact sheet provides a one page talking paper that is full of numbers and statistics that are useful in understanding OAF. The Defense Department OAF web page also provided facts about NATO's mission and its members' involvement in the operation.

Afghanistan

This researcher found six books that provided an all-encompassing look at the first six months of OEF. The first is written by Benjamin Lambeth who covers the strengths and weaknesses of airpower in his book, *Air Power against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*. This book was prepared for the United States Central Command Air Forces, and published by the RAND Corporation. This book covers in detail the events leading up to the planning and initial execution of the air portion of OEF thru March 2002. Lambeth's analysis included the distinctive accomplishments of OEF. Of note, he describes the new air-ground synergy between air and SOF teams. He also covers some of the problems in execution such as the tension between the combined air operations center and United States Central Command, the need to avoid collateral damage at the expense of mission accomplishment, and the escape of many al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Finally, the book discusses the accolades

and demerits of OEF. The most important for this research is the caution of not overgeneralizing the success of a “one-sided application” of airpower against an enemy that could not counter this threat.¹⁵

In the Graveyard of Empires is the next book of note for this research. Author Seth Jones covers the political history of Afghanistan from Alexander the Great to the current day battle with the Taliban. This book provides a good review of the history of Afghanistan and lays a foundation of the problems other armies have faced in the graveyard of empires known as Afghanistan. While only 133 pages of the book are directly related to the period covered by this research, the remaining 195 explain the reasons for the rebirth of the Taliban insurgency. Jones points out that the limited amount of American boots on the ground may not have been the direct cause of the present day insurgency in Afghanistan, but it certainly played an important part. Jones findings point to the fact that there was, “too little outside support for the Afghan government and too much support for the insurgents.”¹⁶ Of note is the role safe havens in Pakistan have played in the growing insurgency in Afghanistan.

Next, Bob Woodward’s book *Bush at War* provided a great resource for this research. Woodward provides a behind the scenes look at 50 National Security Council meetings and key leader conversations during the 100 days after September 11, 2001. This book provided insight into the decision-making and planning process that transpired at the highest levels in the government and in the military. Especially important for this

¹⁵Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2005), 359.

¹⁶Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2009), 315.

research was the background information on the decision to use air power, combined with covert military forces and indigenous forces to attack al Qaeda and Taliban forces instead of large conventional invasion force.

Another important book for this research was *Understanding War in Afghanistan* by Joseph Collins. This book, much like *In the Graveyard of Empires*, explores the history, land, people and culture of Afghanistan. This book also explores the more recent events leading up to OEF, including the 1992 civil war and the rise of the Taliban. The last half of the book assesses the current situation in Afghanistan through June 2011.

To maintain balance, this researcher reviewed two books published by the United States Army about OEF. The first book reviewed was *The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom*, written by the chief of the History Division of the Center of Military History, Dr. Richard W. Stewart. This book explores OEF from the role the United States Army played in the first six months of the operation. This book analyzes the role of the conventional force in a different light when compared to other publications. In the analysis, the book cautions the reader not to draw too much from the easy collapse of the Taliban; that in fact the Northern Alliance provided a surrogate Army is a situation so unique that readers should be leery of this “new model” of warfare.¹⁷

The next book, *Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operational Forces in Afghanistan* displays the contribution of Army SOF to OEF from September 11, 2001 to May 15, 2002. This book provides a good overview of the history leading up to September 11, 2001. It also provides observation and reflections told from soldiers own

¹⁷Department of the Army, *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002* (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 2004), 45.

accounts during the first eight months of OEF; however, it does not include lessons learned or criticisms of the campaign. This book presented many of the tactical level engagements of war when relating to OEF.

In the monograph authored by Dr. Stephen Biddle and published by the Council on Foreign Relations titled, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implication for Army and Defense Policy” the author explores the Afghan Model and its validity. The Afghan Model is the name given to the use of Special Operation Forces (SOF), Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) and indigenous allied forces to wage war. This article gives validity to the Afghan Model but warns that it will not work in all situations. Dr. Stephen Biddle argues against redesigning the force structure and design of the military based on the Afghan Model. He also argues that misreading the Afghan campaign could cause incorrect application of foreign policy, resulting in underestimating the cost of military operations.¹⁸ Dr. Biddle is currently a Senior Fellows at the Council of Foreign Relations. In November 2002, when his monograph was published, he was a Professor of National Security Studies at the United States Army War College Studies Institute.

Authors Andres, Wills and Griffith rebut the article written by Dr. Stephen Biddle. These authors argue in their monograph, “Winning with Allies: the Strategic Value of the Afghan Model” published in *International Security Journal*, that the view of the Afghan Model is relevant and does deserve a place in American policy. They argue that operations in Afghanistan and Northern Iraq validate the potential of the Afghan Model and urge planners to consider the model as a primary option, not an emergency

¹⁸Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications For Army and Defense Policy” (diss., U.S. Army War College, 2002), 49-58.

procedure. In addition, they offer up the conclusion that the Afghan Model has important ramifications for U.S. policy and the model represents a revolutionary new tool in the U.S. foreign policy.¹⁹ This monograph presents a balanced rebuttal to Dr. Biddle's monograph on the Afghan Model.

Dr. Stephen Biddle rebuts the article written by Anders, Wills, and Griffith, titled "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare" and was published in the *International Security Journal*. Dr. Biddle thesis is that the Afghan Model will only work when the allied indigenous forces possess similar skills and motivation as their enemy forces. His rationale for this argument is that forces with inferior skills cannot exploit precision airpower even with the assistance of SOF. Dr. Biddle agrees that the Afghan Model in certain circumstance can work, but it will work fewer places then Andres, Wills, and Griffith believe it will. The one example Dr. Biddle gives where the Afghan Model might work is South Korea. There, the forces are equally matched in terms of skill and motivation.

The article "The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq" written by Richard Andres who was also a co-author of "Winning with Allies," argues that the Afghan Model was proven valid in Northern Iraq during OIF. Andres states that SOF forces along with Kurdish rebels used air strikes to defeated Iraqi regular and Republican Guard army divisions.²⁰ Andres' argues that the Afghan Model will work even when indigenous forces allied with

¹⁹Richard Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith, "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 47-49.

²⁰Richard Andres, "The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 3 (June 2006): 395-422.

U.S. forces are of lesser strength than the enemy's ground forces. This point attempts to dismiss one of Stephen Biddle's issues with Afghan Model.

This researcher revived several periodicals and websites for the study of OEF. For the history of Afghanistan, the United States Department of State web site proved a very useful country sheet on Afghanistan. The *Army Times* proved useful in helping understand the lessons learned from OEF, especially the interview with Dr. Stephen Biddle. The *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *Washington Post* provide the basis for the periodical research. These articles provided a wealth of information that provided facts for the study of OEF.

Libya

This research has identified a gap in literature covering Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) and OUP. Notably absent are books covering the recent operations and the lessons learned by NATO and United States African Command. This researcher did find many short articles and a few case studies covering the 2011 Libyan operations. These articles provided the majority of research used in the case study of Libya.

There have been no books published at this time that cover OOD or OUP, however there are books that cover the history leading up to NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya. Dirk Vandewalle's book titled *A History of Modern Libya*, provides a detailed account of the history of Libya from 1900 to 2006. This book proved beneficial in building the history of Libyan nationalism, the influences of the Italians, the rise in power of Qadhafi, and the interaction between Qadhafi and the United States.

The next book used in this research is David Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East*. This book provided information for not only the Libya case study,

but also the previous case study on Afghanistan. In twelve pages, this book provides insight into the modern history of Libya. Starting with the Ottoman rule through Qadhafi, this short read covers the key points in Libya's history.

The House of Commons Library provided several articles that contained valuable information on the military operations in Libya. Ben Smith's article, *Turmoil in the Middle East* provided the background information on the Arab Spring movement and the effect Arab nationalism played in it. Claire Taylor's article, *Military Operations in Libya*, provided a general overview of OUP with citations. The citations were helpful in recreating the key events that happened during OOD and OUP.

The United States Department of State website along with NATO's website provided key dates and details of the operations that help build a timeline. NATO's website was most helpful in capturing the coalition's contributions toward OUP and OOD. The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis group published the Executive Summary for OOD. This document provided several lessons learned from OOD. The most notable for this research is that the lack of boots on the ground hampered intelligence collection, targeting and information operations.²¹

Dr. Christian Anrig, in his article titled "Allied Air Power over Libya," published in the *Air and Space Power Journal*, provides a case study on the 2011 military operations in Libya. Dr. Anrig's conclusion is that airpower leveled the playing field between the poorly trained rebels and Qadhafi's security forces. This article also points out that while ground troops would have expedited the operation, they could also cause a

²¹Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, "Libya Operation Odyssey Dawn Executive Summary," 13, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/409019> (accessed May 3, 2012).

backlash against the NATO led operations. The rest of this article discusses the capability gaps that NATO faces in conduction operations such as OUP without American support.²²

In the January-February 2012 edition of *Military Review* author Amitai Etzioni discusses the success of OUP and its accolades in the article titled, “The Lessons of Libya.” This article captures many quotes of those talking of the success of OUP and the implications as a model for future military operations. This article discusses four lessons learned from OUP. These lessons learned were useful in building the case study on Libya. The conclusion also lists two warnings for the cookie cutter reproduction of the Libyan model. The warnings are the danger of using a humanitarian mission to accomplish regime change and the replacement of a dictator will not equate to a democratic government.²³

Stephen Biddle in his article, “The Libya Dilemma: The Limits of Air Power” published in the *Washington Post* provides balance to the OUP discussion. Biddle’s point is that an operation such as OUP and the Afghan Model will work, but only in certain situations. Biddle has written several articles about this subject and his thoughts are used throughout this research.

The remaining review of literature for OOD and OUP comes from newspapers and periodicals. The *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, and *Los Angeles Times* provided

²²Christian Anrig, “Allied Air Power over Libya,” *Air and Space Power Journal* (Winter 2011): 89-109, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-1/2012_1_02_anrig_s_eng.pdf (accessed April 26, 2012).

²³Amitai Etzioni, “The Lessons of Libya,” *Review of Military Literature* 92, no. 1 (January-February 2012): 45-54.

excellent sources to build an understanding of the 2011 conflict in Libya. *Foreign Affairs* and *Time Magazine* also provided a wealth of information on the operation in Libya.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS

OAF began on March 24, 1999, and was “the most intense and sustained military operation in Europe since the end of World War II.”²⁴ The purpose of this operation was to halt human rights violations by Yugoslavia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic, against ethnic Kosovar Albanians living in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The 78-day air campaign, the longest campaign since Vietnam, ended on June 9, 1999, when Milosevic accepted NATO’s conditions and removed Serb forces from Kosovo.²⁵ Former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael J. Dugan had this to say about the role of air power, “For the first time in some 5,000 years of military history-5,000 years of history of man taking organized forces into combat-we saw an independent air operation produce a political result.”²⁶ While this is true, there are many lessons to learn from OAF.

To fully understand and appreciate OAF and its mission to end Milosevic’s efforts to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority living in Kosovo, one must look at the sometimes-disputed history of the region, the influences of religion and the rise in nationalism. For generations both Serb and Albanians have laid claim to Kosovo and have used history to defend these claims. Albanians claim they are the original inhabitants of Kosovo claiming lineage to the ancient Illyrians who lived in the Balkan

²⁴Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), v.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶James Kitfield, “Another Look at the Air War That Was,” *Air Force Magazine*, October 10, 1999, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1999/October%201999/1099airwar.aspx> (accessed January 6, 2012), 2.

region somewhere around 2000 BCE.²⁷ Meanwhile the Serbs also point to history and a key battle in Kosovo. This battle occurred on June 28, 1389, at Polje, Kosovo when Serbian Prince Lazar unsuccessfully fought the invading Ottoman Turks.²⁸

By 1459, all of present-day Serbia, to include Kosovo, was under Turkish control.²⁹ Under Turkish control, the population and religious balance changed as Serbs migrated out of the area and were replaced by Muslim Albanians.³⁰ A Serb uprising against Ottoman rule failed in 1689.³¹ Fearing reprisals 30,000 Serbian families fled from the region to southern Hungary, which in turn further reduced Serb influence in Kosovo.³² The remaining Muslim Albanians in Kosovo rose into favor and power under Ottoman rule. In the late 18th century, the Ottoman Empire began to lose its control over the region. In 1878, Serbia became an independent state, but Kosovo was still under Ottoman rule.³³ In this same year, the League of Prizren was created giving birth to a rise in Albanian nationalism.³⁴ In the Balkan War of 1912, Serbian and other Balkan states liberated Kosovo from Ottoman rule. “For Kosovo’s Serbs the arrival of the Serbian

²⁷Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. Albania, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/12472/Albania> (accessed December 3, 2011).

²⁸Tim Judah, “History, Bloody History,” *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo/110492.stm (accessed December 3, 2011).

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹William Hagan, “The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July 1999).

³²Ibid.

³³Judah, “History, Bloody History.”

³⁴Ibid.

Army was liberation. For Albanians, by now the majority population, it was nothing short of an occupation, coupled with massacres and expulsions.”³⁵

Tension continued to build in June of 1914 when Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian student, Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo. Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which led to the start of World War I. The Serbian Army was defeated in Kosovo and forced to evacuate with the aid of Allied warships. Following the Allies' victory in World War I, Kosovo became part of the “new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, (and was) ruled by (a) Serbian king.”³⁶ During the interwar period, Serbia attempted to resettle Serbs in Kosovo in order to dilute the ethnic Albanian population.

On April 6, 1941, Germany invaded Yugoslavia, which fell a mere 10 days later. The Nazis gave control of present-day Kosovo to the puppet state of Greater Albania, which had been an Italian Colony since 1939. During World War II, atrocities against both Serbian and ethnic Albanians were commonplace. Following World War II, the Serbs dominated the communist party ruled by Josip Broz Tito, who drew up the borders of present-day Kosovo. In July 1945, Serbia officially annexed Kosovo as a province inside of Serbia. In 1966, Tito began to loosen control over the region of Kosovo. In 1974, Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution giving “de facto republic status to Kosovo.”³⁷ Tito was able to keep tension under control until his death in 1980.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Steven Woehrel, “Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current,” CRS Report to Congress (June 3, 1999), <http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RS20213.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2012).

³⁷Ibid.

Following Tito's death Yugoslavia began to fall apart. During this period, Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia. On April 24, 1987, Milosevic gave a rousing speech to Serbs at Kosovo Polje, following a fight between Serb protesters and Kosovo police forces.³⁸ Milosevic vowed, "No one should dare to beat you!"³⁹ This speech launched Milosevic as a national leader who would go on to become President of Serbia. In 1989 and 1990, the Serbian Parliament passed legislation that removed autonomy from Kosovo, which resulted in the firing of over 80,000 ethnic Albanians from their jobs.⁴⁰

In 1991, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia broke apart and fell into civil war, which further complicated issues in Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rose to power in 1996 and attacked Serb police, Albanian collaborators and Serb civilians.⁴¹ These attacks, along with others, caused a massive assault on February 28, 1998, by Serb forces on the village of Perekaz where Adam Jashari, a leader of the KLA lived.⁴² During these attacks, the Serb forces were accused of committing atrocities against Albanian civilians including women and children, which triggered a full-fledged insurgency and a rapid expansion in the KLA movement. The tipping point that resulted in armed NATO intervention occurred on January 17, 1999,

³⁸Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), 341.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 341. Some claim the number of Albanians fired was closer to 100,000. See Woehrel, "Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current."

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 347.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 355.

⁴²Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2002), 279.

when international monitors found the bodies of forty-five Albanians murdered by Serb forces near the village of Racak.⁴³

Following the massacre at Racak, international leaders called a conference in Rambouillet, France to give diplomacy one last chance before military action. The Rambouillet conference started on February 6, 1999, and included representatives from the Belgrade government, Kosovar Albanians and KLA.⁴⁴ On March 18, 1999, negotiations ceased when the Kosovars signed the agreement presented by the conference co-chairs and the Serbs did not.⁴⁵ With the Kosovars signing the agreement at Rambouillet and the Serbs failing to, it provided the international consensus that NATO used to carry out military action against Slobodan Milosevic. In fact, NATO did not obtain specific UN Security Council resolution for the use of armed intervention against Yugoslavia; instead, NATO based its actions on previous UN resolutions namely UN Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 passed in 1998. These previous resolutions limited Serbian military activities in Kosovo and were the legal justification NATO used to carry out OAF.⁴⁶

With diplomacy failing to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and an ambiguous UN commitment, NATO and America's President Bill Clinton looked toward military intervention to stop the killings. The United States military objective according to

⁴³Ibid., 294. Some books claim the massacre occurred on January 15, 1999 see Bacevich and Cohen, *War over Kosovo*.

⁴⁴Daalder and O'Hanlon, 78-79.

⁴⁵Ibid., 84.

⁴⁶Ibid., 102.

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen was to, “degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”⁴⁷ General Clark commanded OAF as the dual hatted commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. General Clark had to fight this conflict without the use of a large ground invasion threat.

NATO’s reason for not offering a ground threat for this operation was twofold. The first was the result of difficulties with logistics, terrain and basing opportunities. The second reason, which carried more weight, was the concern over a lack of support from President Clinton’s administration, Congress, the American people and NATO allies to accept combat casualties.⁴⁸

An *ABC News* poll in late March 1999 showed, “only 37-45 percent (of those polled) agreed that it would be worth the loss of some American soldiers’ lives if the United States could help bring peace to Kosovo.”⁴⁹ A RAND report put the overall average of American support for ground combat in Kosovo from March 24 to June 10 at only 34.1 percent, while 56.4 of those polled supported an air war during this same time.⁵⁰ Secretary of Defense Cohen said this about congressional support for sending

⁴⁷Operation Allied Force, “Mission,” <http://www.defense.gov/specials/kosovo/> (accessed January 16, 2012).

⁴⁸Lambeth, 12.

⁴⁹Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, *American Support For U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2005).

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 78. The RAND study looked at an average of poll numbers from March 24 through June 10. “Three questions were from *ABC News/Washington Post*’s polling on

combat troops to Kosovo, “I saw no consensus of support for it in Congress. It was hard enough going up to the Hill even talking about peacekeeping missions at the time.”⁵¹ NATO’s member nations did not strongly support a ground invasion, but European allies did deploy 12,000 troops by the time the air war started in March 1999.⁵² However, NATO could not effectively employ ground forces without the support of the United States. Therefore, with public opinion and Allied cohesion as strategic centers of gravity, planning and subsequent operations would have to protect them as the operation progressed.

General John P. Jumper, Commanding General of the United States Air Force in Europe reported that by the onset of OAF, planners had worked out no less than forty air campaign plans. The “coercive air operation” was comprised of three phases. Phase I would focus on gaining air superiority by attacking Serbian air defense systems and their command and control systems. Phase 2 would attack military targets south of the 44th parallel to the Kosovo border. Phase 3 would expand air operations north of the 44th parallel including Serbia’s capital Belgrade.⁵³

the matter, five were from Gallup, and two were from Princeton Survey Research Associates.”

⁵¹Daalder and O’Hanlon, 18.

⁵²Roger Cohen, “Crisis in the Balkans: The Strategy; Elite Forces Standing by If Air Power Won’t Work,” *New York Times*, April 3, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/03/world/crisis-balkans-strategy-elite-forces-standing-if-air-power-won-t-work.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (accessed March 1, 2012).

⁵³Air Force Historical Studies Office, “1999-Operation Allied Force,” <http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18652> (accessed January 16, 2012). Also, see Lambeth, 12.

OAF commenced on March 24, 1999, with volleys of Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by United States and British ships and air launched cruise missiles from B-52's. In addition to these attacks, American and NATO aircraft flew 400 missions, of which 120 were strike missions against 40 targets.⁵⁴ General Clark reflects on opening night by saying, "It had been a good night's work. Three Mig-29's down, including one by a Dutch F-16, which underscores the Allies' involvement. All our command and control systems were working well and we struck over 80 percent of the planned targets."⁵⁵ The next three nights of attacks increased in intensity but failed to force Milosevic to stop his atrocities in Kosovo.

By the fourth day of OAF, it was becoming obvious that the air offensive was not providing the desired effect on Milosevic and General Clark received authorization to proceed to Phase II.⁵⁶ NATO's leaders had hoped for a quick end to the conflict but now faced a test of wills between the NATO alliance and Milosevic. To make matters worse the air campaign in the first four nights caused no serious inconvenience for the Serbs. In fact, it allowed the Serbian forces to escalate ethnic cleansing and "left both NATO and the Clinton administration with no alternative but to continue pressing the air attacks until NATO unambiguously prevailed."⁵⁷

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, had correctly predicted the possibility that Serb led Yugoslavian forces might escalate the ethnic

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Clark, 196.

⁵⁶Lambeth, 25.

⁵⁷Ibid., 24-25.

cleansing in response to the air campaign.⁵⁸ During this time many United States military leaders including General Clark, had also argued that air power alone would not be able to stop the ethnic cleansing: “Clinton, according to White House aides, always knew that this goal might prove unachievable with air power.”⁵⁹ The White House aides also believed the President had no choice but to use the air option because NATO estimates in October of 1998 put the number of soldiers required to protect Kosovo civilians at 200,000. After this estimate, the option of a ground force was never a viable option. President Clinton in an interview with CBS’s Dan Rather said, “The thing that bothers me about introducing ground troops into a hostile situation, into Kosovo and into the Balkans, is the prospect of never being able to get them out.”⁶⁰

With the air war pressing to Phase II, it was obvious that the OAF had failed to meet its military objectives. During this time, air operations were hampered by the lack of a credible NATO ground invasion threat, bad weather, stronger than expected integrated air defense system (IADS), poor strategy choice by the Clinton administration and NATO’s political leaders, and having to coordinate an air operation with 19 different NATO countries.⁶¹ This research will now look at each of these issues in detail.

The lack of a credible ground threat limited the effectiveness of OAF. This occurred at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the operation. At the strategic

⁵⁸John Harris, “Clinton Saw No Alternative to Airstrikes,” *Washington Post*, April 1, 1999, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/april99/clinton040199.htm> (accessed January 17, 2012).

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Lambeth, 27 and 34.

level, without a commitment to a ground invasion, “NATO robbed itself of a high leverage threat.”⁶² This commitment of a large invasion force would have shown Milosevic the seriousness of not reaching a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis. Operationally, it allowed the fielded force to disperse into hiding instead of concentrating to defend.⁶³ At the tactical level, these dispersed forces were able to use cover and concealment to avoid attack from the air. General Michael Short, who was the Joint Forces Air Component Commander said, “This conflict was unlike any other in that we did not have a ground element to fix the enemy, to make him predictable, and to give us information as to where the enemy might be.”⁶⁴ Even though NATO had not allied with the KLA, they did provide somewhat of a ground threat especially in the later days of the operation.⁶⁵ This forced the Yugoslav army to be more mobile, exposing it to attack.

The terrain and weather across Serbia and Kosovo provided challenges for NATO’s planners and pilots. Serbia and Kosovo combined are no larger than the state of Kentucky, with Kosovo no larger than the Los Angeles metropolitan area.⁶⁶ The terrain around Kosovo is mostly mountainous with peaks reaching as high as 8,714 feet. This rugged terrain provided protection and concealment for fielded forces. The weather,

⁶²Walter L. Perry et al., *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2002), 111.

⁶³During research, the lack of a credible ground threat was repeatedly listed as a lessons learned from OAF. See *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo*, 112; *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, 242; *Waging Modern War*, 430.

⁶⁴Lambeth, 242.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 243.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 17.

especially low ceilings, further slowed down the air campaign. For example, weather caused the “cancellation or failure of more than half of all scheduled bombing sorties on 20 of the first 35 days of air attacks.”⁶⁷

Serbia possessed a modern IADS; this combined with the poor weather and terrain further added to the anemic start of OAF. This was a very modern IADS threat consisting of SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missiles all connected by underground landlines using more than 100 acquisition and tracking radars.⁶⁸ Serbia also possessed mobile SA-9 and SA-13 missiles along with a magnitude of man-portable infrared surface to air missiles and 1,850 antiaircraft artillery pieces.⁶⁹ To avoid being shot down by the IADS, Allied pilots primarily flew at altitudes above fifteen thousand feet which limited the effectiveness of strike sorties.⁷⁰ With the IADS still a threat, sorties that would have otherwise serviced planned targets had to be allocated for the suppression of enemy air defenses to counter the IADS threat.⁷¹

Another reason the early air attacks did not achieve the strategic objectives was a lack of understanding about Milosevic and Kosovo. NATO leaders to include President Clinton had bet that air strikes would result in a quick war and would force Milosevic back to the bargaining table. Their reasoning for betting on a quick victory was based on their history with Milosevic. President Clinton stated a month into the bombing:

⁶⁷Ibid., 37.

⁶⁸Ibid., 17-18.

⁶⁹Ibid., 17.

⁷⁰Daalder and O’Hanlon, 18.

⁷¹Ibid.

The reason we went forward with the air action is because we thought there was some chance it would deter Mr. Milosevic based on two previous examples number one, last October in Kosovo, when he was well poised to do the same thing; and number two, in Bosnia, where there were 12 days of NATO attacks over a 20-day period.⁷²

This proved untrue in the case of Kosovo. Milosevic, like most Serbs, had a strong attachment to Kosovo and viewed Kosovo as the “cradle of Serbia’s identity.”⁷³

Milosevic also gained political identity by rallying support for increased Serb control of Kosovo back in 1987.⁷⁴

The final reason for the lackluster start of OAF was the difficulty in the coordination and cohesion between 19 different NATO countries. Most NATO countries favored a graduated response to the Kosovo crisis and supported a limited air option.⁷⁵ Maintaining NATO cohesion a top priority, that it in turn shaped target selection; however, running the war by committee would be impossible.⁷⁶ Therefore, because of the fear of collateral damage, target selection required the approval of at least the big three players, the United States, Britain and France.⁷⁷ In General Clark’s book, he explains that once NATO moved past the obvious Phase I targets, IADS and runways, striking Phase II

⁷²The American President Project, “William J. Clinton: The President’s News Conference,” <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=57458#axzz1tBGhQZSR> (accessed April 26, 2012).

⁷³Hosmer, 8-10.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Clark, 124. General Clark in his book talks about the difficulty of coordinating between the 19 different NATO countries.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 266.

targets required President Clinton's approval. American Generals also complained that after OAF, France had placed restrictions on targets, which slowed the pace of the air war.⁷⁸

With air attacks failing to achieve the strategic objectives, NATO finally agreed to escalate the air campaign. During NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit, held in Washington D.C. on April 23-24, 1999, member nations showed great cohesion and a renewed sense of dedication to NATO's success in Kosovo.⁷⁹ This allowed NATO's target lists to grow. For example, following the summit, NATO's air attacks focused more on Phase III targets, which included Serb television, electrical infrastructure and the business interests of Milosevic's family and friends.⁸⁰ NATO's target list grew from 169 at the start of the campaign to more than 967 at the end of the campaign.⁸¹ Not only did the target lists grow, but so too did the strike sorties. At the beginning of May 1999, NATO's aircraft were flying an average of 150 strike sorties per day and that number grew to 250 sorties by the end of the month.⁸² In the three days leading up to June 2, 1999, the number of strike sorties was greater than 300 per day.⁸³

⁷⁸Clark, 200.

⁷⁹Daalder and O'Hanlon, 138.

⁸⁰Ibid., 145. Also see Lambeth, 39.

⁸¹Ibid., 38.

⁸²Hosmer, 97.

⁸³Ibid., 97. The exact number of strike sorties flown was 309 on May 30, 323 on May 31, and 319 on June 1.

While the air campaign was increasing in intensity so were the KLA ground operations in Kosovo. On May 26, 1999, the KLA launched Operation Arrow, a counter-offensive that involved more than 4,000 guerrillas supported by artillery from the Albanian Army. Operation Arrow was the first major assault by KLA forces in more than a year and represented the first known direct NATO air support for the KLA. Officially, NATO did not want to align itself with the KLA nor did they want to pick sides in the conflict between Serb forces and the KLA. For most of OAF, NATO and the KLA force “fought parallel but separate wars” against Yugoslavian forces.⁸⁴ Even though there is evidence to the contrary, both the United States government and the KLA denied coordinating their operations in advance.⁸⁵

On June 2, 1999, Russia’s envoy to the Balkans, Viktor Chernomyrdin and the European Union representative Martti Ahtisaari, presented Milosevic with an ultimatum to stop the conflict in Kosovo. A few days before this meeting, the Russian envoy Chernomyrdin told Milosevic, “that if he did not accept the coalition’s terms he would face not only intensified bombing, but also the threat of a NATO ground invasion and that, in those circumstances, Russia could do nothing to help him.”⁸⁶ Milosevic accepted the proposal stating on June 3, 1999, “I accept the proposal as a peaceful proposal.”⁸⁷ On June 9, 1999, the 78-day bombing campaign ended and peacekeeping forces arrived in Kosovo the next day.

⁸⁴Lambeth, 53-54.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Sell, 308-309.

⁸⁷Ibid.

In total, NATO's alliance aircraft flew 38,004 sorties. NATO expended 28,236 munitions of which the United States Air Force delivered 75 percent, or 21,120 munitions. Approximately 35 percent of all the munitions employed were precision guided. Coalition aircraft flew from 47 different locations in Europe and the United states during the 78-day air campaign.⁸⁸ While OAF was indeed an impressive display of combat power, did air power alone cause Milosevic to yield to NATO's demands?

The argument of why Milosevic capitulated when he did and the role air power played is still in question today, some 13 years after the first bombs of OAF exploded. This research will first explore what some call the ground centric view of why Milosevic agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 1244. General Clark offers this insight into why Milosevic accepted NATO's terms: "Planning and preparation for ground intervention were well under way by the end of the campaign, and I am convinced that this, in particular, pushed Milosevic to concede."⁸⁹ A KLA commander had this to say, "One of the reasons Milosevic had to end the war was because we (the KLA force) were attacking from the border and he was obliged to bring in many units who made good targets."⁹⁰ Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon wrote:

Airpower might best be thought of as the force driving Milosevic into a dead-end corridor and threatening to crush him against the far wall. But had NATO not remained unified, Russia not joined hands with NATO in the diplomatic endgame, and the alliance had not developed a credible threat of a ground

⁸⁸Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds., *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 21.

⁸⁹Clark, 425.

⁹⁰Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 284.

invasion, Milosevic might have found doors through which to escape from the corridors despite aerial punishment.⁹¹

The air-centric view of OAF gives more credit to the role of air power in ending Milosevic's attacks into Kosovo. For example, John Tirpak, writing in the *Air Force Magazine* states: "For the first time in history, the application of air power alone forced the wholesale withdraw of a military force from a disputed piece of real estate."⁹² In the book, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, author Stephen Hosmer states in his conclusion, "it was the cumulative impact of NATO air power and the future threat it posed that most influenced Milosevic's eventual decision to come to terms."⁹³ In addition, Hosmer's states: "According to Milosevic's own testimony and the contemporary statements of senior FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) officials and close Milosevic associates, the key reason why Milosevic agreed to accept NATO's terms was his fear of the bombing that would follow if he refused."⁹⁴ While the argument of what forced Milosevic to accept NATO's agreement rages on the fact is both the air and ground centric camps have important points to consider.

Let us now explore the four major lessons learned from OAF. First, the lack of a credible ground threat significantly hampered mission accomplishments; with the threat of a ground invasion off the table, fielded forces were not required to mass for a defense

⁹¹Daalder and O'Hanlon, 184.

⁹²John Tirpak, "Washington Watch: Lessons Learned and Re-Learned," *Air Force Magazine*, August 1999, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1999/August%201999/0899watch.aspx> (accessed February 5, 2012).

⁹³Hosmer, 123.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, xvii.

and instead were able to remain dispersed and hidden from air attacks. The early decision not to provide large amounts of ground forces for a possible invasion may have given Milosevic the impression that NATO was not fully committed to Kosovo.

Second, the gradualist and minimalistic approach to the conflict failed to exploit the shock and awe value of strategic air attack. Airpower should not be employed in piecemeal packages; however, NATO leaders believed that if limited bombing did not work, they always had the option to increase the intensity of the bombing. In the end, the bombing of the strategic targets that affected Milosevic's political power base was instrumental in resolving the Kosovo conflict.

Third, air power alone was not able to stop the ethnic cleansing; however, air power after 78-days of attacks, did force Milosevic to accept NATO's peace agreement. The inability to stop ethnic cleansing is a serious limiting factor when using airpower alone to achieve this political objective. In fact, after the bombing started so too did the increase in ethnic cleansing. In the end, the bombing campaign, along with talk of a potential ground invasion eventually forced Milosevic to accept NATO's agreement, but it did little during the 78-day bombing campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing.

Fourth and finally, the importance of maintaining the coalition was more important than obtaining operational objectives. NATO's center of gravity at the strategic level was maintaining a coalition of 19 different nation states while the 78-day bombing campaign transpired. If NATO was going to win the war, they would need to choose their targets carefully and suffer some tactical and operational setbacks to win the strategic battle.

Key points to consider from OAF as the research continues forward are cost, public support and coercive diplomacy. During the 38,000 combat sorties of OAF, NATO lost no pilots and only two aircraft during combat operations.⁹⁵ The OAF cost the United States taxpayers a little more than \$3 billion and resulted in less than 500 civilian casualties from errant air attacks.⁹⁶ Next, when presented with evidence of atrocities, there was clear political support in the United States for an air campaign, but it was difficult to build support for a ground war for the fear of a Balkan quagmire.⁹⁷ Finally, air power, when used as coercive diplomacy, can achieve a political objective.

Moving onto the next case study, this research will now review OEF in Afghanistan. This research will cover the conventional phase of the operation from October 2001 to March 2001. While OEF is still ongoing some ten years after it began, there is value in studying the first six months of the operation. Just as in the OAF case study, it is important to understand the history of Afghanistan before exploring the case study.

The history of Afghanistan is a book in and among itself. Referred by many as the “Grave Yard of Empires” Afghanistan has a long history of conflict dating back to 328 BC when Alexander the Great suffered unexpected losses against Afghan tribes.⁹⁸ This was not the last conflict in Afghanistan as the “Scythians, White Huns, and Turks

⁹⁵Lambeth, 246.

⁹⁶Ibid., 219.

⁹⁷William C. Martel, *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 220.

⁹⁸Jones, xxv.

invaded in following centuries.”⁹⁹ In 642 AD, the Arabs gained control of present day Afghanistan and introduced Islam to its people. In 1219, Genghis Khan destroyed the city of Balkh and devastated the area surrounding it.¹⁰⁰ For the next five centuries, conflict and invasion were present in the lands of Afghanistan by forces in and outside of the country.

In the 19th century, the expanding British and Russian Empires would clash in the battlegrounds of Afghanistan. This conflict termed “The Great Game,” resulted in three Anglo-Afghan Wars lasting from 1839 to 1919. The first Anglo War lasted from 1839-1842 and ended with the destruction of the retreating column of 16,500 individuals, composed of 4,500 fighting troops, 12,000 Indian camp followers with the only survivor being a British doctor.¹⁰¹ The second Anglo-Afghan war lasted from 1878-1880 and resulted from disputes over Russian influence in Kabul. During this period of occupation, envoy Sir Mortimer Durand established the Durand Line, which separated Afghanistan and British controlled India. The Durand Line also separated the Pashtun tribes leaving a third of them in Afghanistan and two thirds of them in present day Pakistan. The Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 was short lived but the British did use biplanes to bomb

⁹⁹U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Afghanistan,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm> (accessed March 7, 2012).

¹⁰⁰Charles Briscoe et al., *Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 2.

¹⁰¹Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: a Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 176 and 186. Other documents reported that several camp followers also survived the retreat.

cities. The war weary British soon signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 8, 1919, which granted full independence to Afghanistan.¹⁰²

Following Afghanistan's independence from British rule the Soviet Union was the first nation to recognize Afghanistan as a new state. King Amanullah was also the first Afghan ruler to take aid from the Soviet Union, which in 1920 included five thousand rifles and one million gold rubles.¹⁰³ King Amanullah also attempted to modernize Afghanistan by opening co-educational schools, reforming taxation and conscription rules, and implementing social changes such as removing the veil from women. However, he alienated the religious and tribal leaders and abdicated his crown due to a civil revolt. Following nine months of revolt in Afghanistan, Nadir Shah rose to power. In 1933, a man seeking revenge for the death of a family member assassinated Nadir Shah. Nadir's teenage son, Kahir Shah, took over with the aid of his paternal uncles and ruled from 1933 to 1973.¹⁰⁴ During King Shah's rule, he appointed his cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud to serve as Prime Minister from 1953-1963. Daoud successfully attained military and economic assistance from Washington and Moscow; however, his support for the creation of a separate Pashtun state resulted in his dismissal in March 1963.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰²Joseph Collins, *Understanding War in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 16-18. Also see Jones, 7.

¹⁰³Tanner, 221.

¹⁰⁴Collins, 18-19.

¹⁰⁵U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Afghanistan."

In 1964, King Shah enacted a new liberal constitution intended to provide greater freedom to the Afghan people, however, this attempt at liberal freedom allowed the Communist to establish the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on January 1, 1965. The PDPA had close ties with Moscow and received funding from the KGB. In 1973, while King Shah was out of the country, former Prime Minister Daoud with the support from the PDPA led a bloodless coup. Daoud proclaimed Afghanistan a republic and appointed himself its president. President Daoud, realizing that Afghanistan had become too close with the Soviet Union, purged his government of PDPA ministers and reduced the number of Soviet military advisors.¹⁰⁶

Over the next five years, President Daoud's support base eroded while the PDPA's power and support grew larger. Then on April 27, 1978, following the assassination of Communist activists, select communist military officers led a successful coup killing President Daoud and his family.¹⁰⁷ This coup is referred to as the Saur (April) Revolution and resulted in the PDPA changing the name of the country to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁸

Following the Saur Revolution, Moscow provided military aid to help stabilize the newfound communist state.¹⁰⁹ The new PDPA government, led by Nur Mohammad Tarki, "imposed a Marxist style reform program which ran counter to deeply rooted

¹⁰⁶Tanner, 226-231.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Collins, 25. Also called the Saur Revolution. See Jones 12.

¹⁰⁹Jones, 13.

Afghan traditions.”¹¹⁰ For example, at a government rally in Kabul, the PDPA leadership replaced the traditional green Afghan flag with a new red one. During this same meeting, the government announced its new agenda, “equal rights and education for women, national language status for Uzbek . . . and Nuristani, credit reform and land redistribution.”¹¹¹ These actions result in unrest especially in the tribal areas. “Pashtun tribesmen in the eastern mountains grabbed their rifles. The Kunar Valley, the central Hindu Kush and Badakshan became antigovernment strong holds.”¹¹²

In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin seized power from Tarki. In December 1979, with the seeds of an insurgency planted and instability growing, Moscow signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan. This greatly increased the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. However, by October 1979 the Soviets were becoming increasingly displeased with Amin who refused to take advice from the Soviets on how to fix the deteriorating situation in his country.¹¹³ These events, fueled by mission creep, led to an even greater Soviet involvement.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 when its elite forces began flying into Kabul Airport and Bagram Air Base. On December 27, 1979, Soviet forces killed Amin. At this time, there were already 50,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.¹¹⁴ During the Soviet’s ten-year experience in Afghanistan, they were unable

¹¹⁰U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Afghanistan.”

¹¹¹Tanner, 231.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Afghanistan.”

¹¹⁴Jones, 19. Also see Briscoe et al., 10.

to govern the tribal areas and suffered a death by a thousand cuts. For example, following the Soviet invasion, 120,000 Soviet troops were “unable to establish authority outside of Kabul,” with as much as “80% of the countryside, including parts of Herat and Kandahar, eluding effective government control.”¹¹⁵

The principal enemy of the Soviet’s during their occupation of Afghanistan was the Mujahedeen also called Holy War warriors. The Mujahedeen declared a Jihad against the Soviet invaders. Following the Soviet invasion, there were as many as 40 separate Mujahedeen groups; however, by 1982 the Mujahedeen groups had organized into seven groups called the “Peshawar Seven.”¹¹⁶ The Mujahedeen, with funding from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and the United States were able to mount a successful insurgency against the Soviets.¹¹⁷

The Soviets, having expended large amounts of blood and treasure, were looking for an exit strategy. On April 14, 1988, President Gorbachev signed the Geneva Accords stipulating the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989, which they did.¹¹⁸ The ten-years of war had cost the Soviets the lives of nearly 15,000 soldiers and wounded an additional 35,000. Estimates put the number of Afghans killed at one million with five million fleeing to neighboring countries and an additional three million

¹¹⁵U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Afghanistan.”

¹¹⁶Edgar O’Ballance, *Afghan Wars*, rev. ed. (Herndon, VA: Brassey’s UK, 2003), 115-116.

¹¹⁷Jones, 37 and 46. The United States gave between \$4 and \$5 billion between 1980 and 1992 and included 400 Stinger missiles. Saudi Arabia gave nearly \$4 billion in aid to the Mujahedeen between 1980-1990

¹¹⁸Tanner, 268.

internally displaced. The CIA estimates that between 1980 and 1986, the Soviet Union spent \$42 billion on the conflict in Afghanistan.¹¹⁹

The Soviets left Najibullah and his PDPA forces in control of Afghanistan after withdrawing, but Najibullah lost control in 1992 as the country slipped into a civil war. The UN helped set-up a provisional government, but it too soon failed. The fighting in the civil war was brutal. For example, “from April 1992 to April 1993 much of Kabul was destroyed and 30,000 inhabitants were killed with another 100,000 wounded.”¹²⁰ The civil war was a power struggle between the different Mujahedeen groups and warlords funded by outside power brokers with clear battle lines. “Iran, India and Russia supported the Rabbani government and northern commander such as Massoud. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Pashtun opposition groups such as Hekmatyars’s Hezbi-i-Islami.”¹²¹

During this not so civil war, a group called the Taliban began to rise in power. In 1994, local people called on Mullah Mohammed Omar to revenge the raping of several girls. Mullah Omar then turned to the Taliban to help restore law and order. “The ranks of the Taliban grew in direct proportion to the society’s desperate desire for order.”¹²² The Taliban forces advanced rapidly through Afghanistan, with their primary objective to restore peace and enforce sharia law. The Taliban captured Kandahar in 1994, Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998 and Taloqan in 2000. By 2001, the Taliban

¹¹⁹Jones, 25.

¹²⁰Collins, 35.

¹²¹Jones, 46.

¹²²Tanner, 279.

controlled all of Afghanistan except for a small sliver of northeast Afghanistan, which the Northern Alliance controlled.¹²³

In 1996, during the Taliban's rise to power they played host to Osama bin Laden and the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Bin Laden, expelled from Sudan and banned from Saudi Arabia, found protection in Afghanistan. In return, Bin Laden, a veteran Mujahedeen fighter, provided the Taliban with financial and organizational support. In 1992 and again in 1996, Bin Laden, upset by America's involvement in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, called for a jihad against western forces and specifically called for attacks on American forces. Prior to September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda was responsible for several attacks against American interests including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar towers bombing in 1996, the bombing of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. On September 9, 2001, in a precursor of greater events to follow, al-Qaeda forces, masquerading as journalists, assassinated the leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud. The Northern Alliance was the anti-Taliban movement and this assassination further solidified Taliban support for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist group.¹²⁴

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 took America by surprise and forced decision makers into crisis action planning. Soon after these attacks, the United States discovered evidence that al-Qaeda, based in Afghanistan, was responsible for these attacks.

¹²³Jones, 57-66.

¹²⁴Martel, 226-227.

Afghanistan is a land locked country, roughly the size of Texas with a population of around 24 million. The terrain is a combination of deserts in the south and east, massive mountain ranges in the north and rough terrain along the eastern border region with Pakistan. This rough tribal terrain had been an obstacle during the Russians occupation of Afghanistan. These factors, combined with long logistical lines of communication would make planning for combat operations challenging, if possible at all.¹²⁵

With al-Qaeda and bin Laden in American's sights, policy leaders turned to the military for options to strike back. However, according to Bob Woodward, the military had no plans for Afghanistan, "there was nothing on the shelf that could be pulled down to provide at least an outline."¹²⁶ The Joint Chief of Staff Chairman, General Hugh Shelton, however, did present the National Security Council with three options at the initial war cabinet sessions at Camp David. The first was an immediate cruise missile attack against al Qaeda training camps. This "pound sand" option was quickly dismissed as ineffective because the training sites were known to be empty. The second option called for a ten day bombing campaign. The last option included the bombing campaign, but added United States ground forces.¹²⁷

President Bush made it clear to his staff that he wanted a military plan that would cause real pain and destruction to the terrorists responsible for these attacks. The

¹²⁵Department of the Army, *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002*, 7.

¹²⁶Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 25.

¹²⁷Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 50.

President said, “I don’t want a photo-op war” I want “a realistic score card (with) a list of thugs.”¹²⁸ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pressured United States Central Command’s commander, General Tommy Franks for military plans that were, “creative ideas, something between launching cruise missiles and an all-out military operation.”¹²⁹ General Tommy Franks replied that it would take months to get the necessary forces in place and plans created, to which Secretary Rumsfeld replied, “you don’t have months” you need to think days or weeks.¹³⁰

On September 15, 2001 in a meeting at Camp David, CIA’s director George Tenet introduced an option for striking back at America’s enemies in Afghanistan. Tenet’s plan called for deploying “CIA paramilitary operatives and uniformed special operation forces (SOF) to aid Afghan opposition groups while Taliban and al Qaeda targets were bombed and to conduct any such bombing without any Vietnam-like incrementalism.”¹³¹ The CIA had been supporting the Northern Alliance through a covert program that supplied the rebels with several million dollars per year. In fact, following the September 11 attacks, the Northern Alliance offered its support to the United States to help hunt down bin Laden. The CIA estimated that the Northern Alliance had close to 20,000 fighters compared to the 45,000 troops the Taliban had.¹³² With the Taliban

¹²⁸Woodward, 49.

¹²⁹Ibid., 49.

¹³⁰Ibid., 43.

¹³¹Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 45.

¹³²Ibid., 46.

having the advantage in forces, it was vital for the United States to have Pakistan as its ally.

A few weeks before the September 11 attacks, the United States ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, spoke with President Pervez Musharraf about Afghanistan. In this discussion Musharraf stated, “Pakistan needs strategic depth in Afghanistan to ensure there is a friendly regime on Pakistan’s western border.”¹³³ Less than one month later, the United States would be asking Musharraf to end his ties with the Taliban government; the very government Pakistan relied on for strategic depth on its Western side. Pakistan agreed to support the United States with some restrictions. The United States could not launch attacks in Afghanistan from Pakistan, American aircraft could not use bases in India to attack Afghanistan and the United States would provide economic aid to Pakistan. It is important to note that, “Pakistan was very cooperative (and) their support was critical,” said the United States ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin.¹³⁴

In addition to Pakistan’s support, the United States would also need to secure the support of Russia, the former republics of the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. This support was critical, because as mentioned before, Afghanistan is a land locked country, which severely restricts access at best. President Putin granted use of Russian airspace for humanitarian over flights and the use of Russian combat search and rescue assets. In addition, Putin would not object to the United States seeking the support of the former Soviet Union republics. The United States, for its part, sought basing options from

¹³³Jones, 87.

¹³⁴Ibid., 88-89.

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The Saudis caused real problems with access claimed some United States officials. United States Central Command had just built a brand new combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base that would be critical in conducting air operations against Taliban forces. Though the Saudi Royal family waived on support for the United States led coalition, in the end they allowed the use of their air bases and their combined air operations center for the beginning of OEF.¹³⁵

The United States strategic objectives in Afghanistan were three fold. First, destroy al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime. This included destroying al-Qaeda's base of operations, hunting down bin Laden, and other al-Qaeda terrorists. Second, support an anti-Taliban resistance movement and set-up an interim government. Third, establish a democratic government in Afghanistan.¹³⁶ The course of action selected to achieve these objectives, also called the Afghan Model, consisted of three elements. First, the heavy reliance on precision guided air delivered munitions. Second, the employment of SOF teams along with CIA paramilitary operatives to identify targets and conduct direct action attacks. Third, the SOF and CIA forces would work with indigenous Afghan opposition groups, such as the Northern Alliance, to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda leaders. Minimizing noncombatant casualties was essential to the success of this campaign; for it showed both the Afghans and the greater Muslim world that this was a war against the Taliban not against Islam.¹³⁷

¹³⁵Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 29 and 35.

¹³⁶Martel, 230-231.

¹³⁷Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 59 and 60.

OEF began on October 7, 2001 when United States led coalition forces attacked Afghanistan. Opposition-group members also attacked Taliban positions near Bagram Air Base with artillery fire. The first night's targets included early warning radars, aircraft, airfields, and command and control facilities. In addition, C-17 cargo airplanes delivered HH-60 helicopters to Uzbekistan for use in search and rescue operations. During OEF, no enemy aircraft fighters were able to get off the ground to attack coalition forces. While some enemy air defenses were employed during the opening days of OEF, the United States "achieved uncontested control of the air over Afghanistan above 20,000 feet. This lack of a credible IADS threat allowed the use of smaller strike packages."¹³⁸

On October 15, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld first announced the cooperation between U.S. airpower and the Northern Alliance ground power.¹³⁹ On October 19, 2001, 200 rangers and two operational detachments A-teams were inserted into the mountains of northern Afghanistan.¹⁴⁰ This was the beginning of the second phase of the operations. The Department of Defense announced shifting the priority from fixed targets to fleeting targets. By October 21, Northern Alliance forces began preparing for an assault on the Northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸Ibid., 78-85.

¹³⁹Joseph Fitchett, "Gunship Use Signals Start of Attacks On Troops," *New York Times*, October 17, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/news/17iht-strategy_ed3__2.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 1, 2012).

¹⁴⁰Briscoe et al., 47.

¹⁴¹Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 94.

On November 9, the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, signaled the end of Taliban control of Northern Afghanistan. In addition, according to Tony Karon a Time magazine reporter, “A victory at Mazar-i-Sharif will be taken as a vindication of the strategy of heavily bombing the Taliban frontlines to weaken their will to fight.”¹⁴² Mr. Karon later downplayed the possible success of the bombing campaign by noting that the Taliban were viewed as occupiers in Mazar-i-Sharif and that the local population would not have supported them in house to house fighting against the Northern Alliance. Following the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif there was a brief battle on November 11, where a Special Forces A-team called in 25 air strikes. These attacks resulted in 2,200 enemy casualties, the destruction of 29 tanks and 6 command posts. This attack opened the way for the Northern Alliance to move towards Kabul.¹⁴³ Two days later on November 13, Northern Alliance forces captured Kabul without a fight. “The Taliban collapse was remarkable. Only two months after the September 11 attacks, the most strategically important city in Afghanistan –Kabul-had been captured.”¹⁴⁴

Following the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul, most of the 60,000 members of the Taliban melted back into the local population and mountains.¹⁴⁵ On November 25, 2001 south of Kandahar marked the arrival of the first elements of conventional forces in

¹⁴²Tony Karon, “Rebels: Mazar-i-sharif Is Ours,” *Time*, November 9, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,183885,00.html> (accessed April 2, 2012).

¹⁴³Woodward, 308-309.

¹⁴⁴Jones, 92.

¹⁴⁵Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 94. CIA reports put the number of Taliban fighter at 45,000 in this same book, see 45-46.

the 7-week war when 1,200 United States Marines arrived there.¹⁴⁶ Up to this point, “the U.S. commitment to overthrow the Taliban had been about 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel, plus massive airpower.”¹⁴⁷ Kandahar fell on December 7, marking the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

Following the fall of the Taliban government, the military campaign shifted its focus to finding bin Laden, his Taliban supporters and al Qaeda followers. On November 30, 2001, allied forces began bombing the rugged mountainous area of Tora Bora along the Pakistan border. United States forces believed that a large number of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were located in this mountainous region to include bin Laden. Over the next three weeks, United States intelligence sources estimated that 1,000 al Qaeda fighters escaped through Tora Bora into Pakistan, including bin Laden himself. CIA officials requested an additional United States Army Ranger battalion to block the border with Pakistan, but military officials instead relied on local Afghan forces.¹⁴⁸ The Washington Post reporters Gleeman and Ricks claimed, “In the fight for Tora Bora, corrupt local militias did not live up to promises to seal off the mountain redoubt, and some colluded in the escape of fleeing al Qaeda fighters.”¹⁴⁹ Following Tora Bora, the

¹⁴⁶CNN.com, “Official: Marines On Ground in Southern Afghanistan,” http://articles.cnn.com/2001-11-26/us/gen.war.against.terror_1_mazar-e-26th-marine-expeditionary-units-kandahar?_s=PM:US (accessed April 2, 2012).

¹⁴⁷Woodward, 314.

¹⁴⁸Jones, 97.

¹⁴⁹Barton Gellman and Thomas Ricks, “U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight,” *Washington Post*, April, 17 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A62618-2002Apr16?language=printer> (accessed April 6, 2012).

Pentagon was criticized for not inserting United States ground forces to block the escape of enemy forces.¹⁵⁰

On December 22, 2001, Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was sworn in as chairman of the new Afghanistan government.¹⁵¹ Establishing this new interim government achieved one of the United States' main objectives. The chance to achieve another objective would happen two months later when intelligence sources identified a large enemy force hiding in the Shah-i-Kot valley. Operation Anaconda began on March 2, 2002 to neutralize these enemy forces in the Shah-i-Kot valley, and consisted of more than 1,500 coalition forces.¹⁵² It was the first sustained combat operation by conventional forces during the first six months of OEF.¹⁵³ During this battle, al Qaeda fought from dug-in fighting positions that proved difficult to destroy. Biddle claims that less than 50 percent of al Qaeda positions were discovered before ground combat and in fact, most fire received during the operation "came from initially unseen and unanticipated al Qaeda fighting

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹A Nation Challenged: Transfer of Power; Afghan Leader Is Sworn In, Asking For Help to Rebuild, *New York Times*, December 23, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/23/world/nation-challenged-transfer-power-afghan-leader-sworn-asking-for-help-rebuild.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed April 6, 2012).

¹⁵²Department of the Army, *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002*, 30.

¹⁵³John Burns, "U.S. Planes Pound Enemy as Troops Face Tough Fight," *New York Times*, March 4, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/04/world/nation-challenged-fighting-us-planes-pound-enemy-troops-face-tough-fight.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (accessed April 8, 2012). Also see Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 163.

positions.”¹⁵⁴ In another article, Biddle claims that when al-Qaeda practice communication security, dispersed their forces, and used cover and concealment the benefits of using standoff PGM decrease and the need for close combat increased.¹⁵⁵

On 1 May 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that major combat operations in Afghanistan had ended and United States forces would begin stability, stabilization and reconstruction activities.¹⁵⁶ During the period from October 7 through December 23, U.S. aircraft conducted 6,500 strike missions, 75 percent of which the United States Navy conducted. Of the munitions released, 60 percent were precision guided, compared to 29 percent in OAF and 9 percent during Desert Storm.¹⁵⁷ Air Force bombers flew around 10 percent of the total sorties but dropped 80 percent of the ordnance released in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁸ The average daily combat sortie rate for the beginning phases of OEF was relatively low, at 80-90 sorties per day.¹⁵⁹ It is estimated that air strikes killed some 375 Afghan civilians during the period from October 2001 until the summer of 2002.

¹⁵⁴Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications For Army and Defense Policy,” 28.

¹⁵⁵Stephen Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 169.

¹⁵⁶CNN.com, “Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan,” http://articles.cnn.com/2003-05-01/world/afghan.combat_1_provincial-reconstruction-teams-afghanistan-afghan-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:asiapcf (accessed April 8, 2012).

¹⁵⁷Martel, 235. Also see Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 248.

¹⁵⁸Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 363-364.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*

Following the fall of the Taliban government, many viewed the Afghan Model as a new American way of war.¹⁶⁰ The Afghan Model relies on airpower to attack strategic targets, while SOF, in conjunction with indigenous forces act as screens to fix enemy forces that are then vulnerable to attack by airpower.¹⁶¹ Biddle states in his monograph, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, that there are two different schools of thought on the Afghan Model. One side argues that the Afghan Model can be widely used in other theaters of war and this in turn would reduce the need for large standing ground forces. The other school of thought is that Afghan model is only applicable to Afghanistan. Biddle argues, “Both views are wide off the mark.”¹⁶²

Biddle argues, “The Afghan Model will not always work as it did in Afghanistan because we will not always enjoy allies (Northern Alliance) who match up so well against their enemies. But where we do, we can reasonably expect the Model to be roughly as lethal as it was last fall and winter.”¹⁶³ Biddle also claims, “It is thus a mistake

¹⁶⁰For information about the Afghan Model see Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications For Army and Defense Policy,” 1.

¹⁶¹Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications For Army and Defense Policy,” 1. Also see Andres, Wills, and Griffith, 5.

¹⁶²Sean Naylor, “The ‘Afghan Model’: War’s future?,” *Army Times*, November, 18, 2002, [http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=NewsBank&p_text_direct-0=document_id=\(%20101AD3F5B0751590%20\)&p_docid=101AD3F5B0751590&p_theme=aggdocs&p_queryname=101AD3F5B0751590&f_openurl=y](http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=NewsBank&p_text_direct-0=document_id=(%20101AD3F5B0751590%20)&p_docid=101AD3F5B0751590&p_theme=aggdocs&p_queryname=101AD3F5B0751590&f_openurl=y) (accessed April 8, 2012).

¹⁶³Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications For Army and Defense Policy,” 1.

to see Afghanistan as a radical break with prior military experience.”¹⁶⁴ His thesis is the key to success in Afghanistan as with traditional warfare has been and always will be the close interaction of fire and maneuver.

Biddle also cautions those who underestimate the cost of future military actions based on the Afghan Model. His argument is that the Afghan Model will not always work and policy makers must be prepared “to pay real costs in at least some important theaters.”¹⁶⁵ Biddle also warns against restructuring the American military towards long-range PGM at the expense of close combat forces. Biddle recommends, “A balanced, all-arms force structure with the ability to integrate precision fires with skilled American ground maneuver thus reduces the risk and offers important leverage in a world where we cannot know exactly where or with whom we may be forced to fight.”¹⁶⁶

Dr. Richard Stewart, echoes Biddle in his historical account of the first six months of OEF. The author of *The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom* argues not to draw too much from the rapid fall of the Taliban government. This author claims the conditions surrounding the use of the Northern Alliance as a surrogate ground army are so “unique that one should be leery of apply any “new model” of warfare wholesale without considering all the unique elements of any other situation.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 54.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 51.

¹⁶⁷Department of the Army, *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002*, 45.

In 2005, authors Andres, Wills, and Griffith refute Dr. Biddle's argument. They argue the Afghan Model does indeed improve the United States' coercive diplomacy options, and should be a tool in the toolbox of foreign policy makers. These authors present three operational and three strategic lessons learned from OEF to prove their point. The first operational lesson learned from OEF is that theater wide bombing forced the Taliban to disperse into small groups that could not move freely. The need to disperse diminished the Taliban's ability to conduct conventional operations, thus rendering them all but ineffective. Next, the authors claim that the age-old army doctrine that defense is a stronger form of battle is no longer true when the attacker possesses air superiority and PGM. The authors point to the battle of Mazar-i-Sharif as an example where 5,000 Taliban troops armed with artillery and armor were unable to defend the city against a force of only 2,000 lightly armed Northern Alliance soldiers.¹⁶⁸ These authors also claim, "new technology available to SOF and airpower transformed the nature of conventional war in Afghanistan" as SOF provided the main effort instead of a supporting role.¹⁶⁹

The authors of *Winning with Allies* go on to state the true importance of the Afghan Model lies in the three strategic implications. The first is that the Afghan Model significantly reduces the cost associated with war. Next, the Afghan Model reduces the likelihood of a long protracted guerrilla war. Finally, the Afghan Model provides leaders with a new foreign policy tool somewhere between diplomacy and the large-scale application of United States combat forces.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Andres, Wills, and Griffith, 20.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 40-45.

While the debate about the Afghan Model rages on just as OEF does today, there are important takeaways that help answer the research question of “does OUP provide a template for how the United States will settle the preponderance of future military operations?” The first point to discuss is the short amount of time required to build up forces and conduct decisive combat operations. The fall of the Taliban was remarkably quick even by modern day standards. American policy makers and military planners built, deployed, executed and defeated the Taliban’s government in 80 days. Compare this to the original estimate given by General Franks that it would take months to draw up plans and get forces positioned for a major military operation.¹⁷¹ The ability to support decisive combat operations is even more astounding when one considers that Afghanistan is a land locked country with serious accessibility issues.

Second, the Afghan Model harnessed the synergist effect of SOF, PGM and indigenous fighting forces. Benjamin Lambeth in his book *Air Power against Terror* states that SOF personnel are now a part of the air power equation and that this new equation helped OEF strike missions achieve more kills per sortie than ever before.¹⁷² Nearly 60 percent of all the munitions dropped during the first six months of OEF were precisions guided. The ability to drop 2,000-pound bombs within a few feet of a fighting position allowed an asymmetrical advantage that the Taliban defender could not overcome. However, United States planners did face problems of locating Taliban and al

¹⁷¹Woodward, 43. On December 9, Karzai arrived in Kandahar the next day the United States Under Secretary of Defense declared the Taliban government had been defeated. Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 148-149.

¹⁷²Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*, 362.

Qaeda leadership. Another problem facing planners was the lack of critical infrastructure elements that could be targeted.¹⁷³

Another benefit of the Afghan Model is that it legitimizes the operation by putting a local face on the combat operations. In the article, *Winning with Allies*, the authors claim the Afghan Model “helps bridge the gap between the United States’ realist aspirations and its ideals by allowing indigenous allies to do the bulk of the fighting and dying to achieve their own freedom.”¹⁷⁴

The third and last lesson learned is that indigenous forces may not have the same end state goals that the United States does. The lessons learned during Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda pay testimony to this fact when anti-Taliban proxy forces simply looked the other way and allowed hundreds or thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces to escape across the border into Pakistan.¹⁷⁵ In addition, the unwillingness to deploy large amounts of American combat troops may have added to the insurgency problem faced in Afghanistan today. “While the light footprint may not have been the direct cause of the Afghanistan insurgency; it certainly played an important part.”¹⁷⁶

While the quick demises of the Taliban government and its al-Qaeda terrorist was indeed impressive, OEF achieved only two of the three objectives set forth. The first goal, to destroy al-Qaeda’s base and hunt down its leader bin Laden would be more than

¹⁷³Martel, 234-235.

¹⁷⁴Andres, Wills, and Griffith, 48.

¹⁷⁵John Hendren, “Afghanistan Yields Lessons for Pentagon’s Next Targets,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 21, 2002, <http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/21/news/mn-24009> (accessed April 8, 2012).

¹⁷⁶Jones, 133.

ten years in the making, however OEF was a good first step in achieving this goal. The next two objectives of setting up an anti-Taliban movement and democratic government were both achieved but the longevity of these objectives is yet to be seen.

The third and final case study in this research covers American and NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya. This case study, much like the previous two, will look at the history of Libya, the events leading up to military intervention and the lessons learned. The military intervention consists of two parts. The first discusses the American led Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) and the second looks at NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) up to the death of Qadhafi.

Libya, not recognized as an independent country until 1951, has had many influences from empires outside its borders including the Greeks, Romans and Arabs to name a few. The Arabs brought Islam to Libya and the people adopted the Arabic language and culture. In the mid-16th century, the Ottoman Empire gained control of present day Libya and held it until 1911. Following the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Italy seized the opportunity to invade Libya and made it their colony.¹⁷⁷ In 1940, when Italy teamed up with Nazi Germany, Libyan nationalists saw an opportunity to shed the yokes of Italian colonialism and sided with the Allies. By 1943, the Allies had forced the Axis troops out of North Africa and liberated Libya. The British retained control of two Libyan provinces and the Free French were given control of the third provinces until the end of the war.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Libya," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm> (accessed April 18, 2012).

¹⁷⁸Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Libya: a Country Study*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989), 31-35.

Following World War II, the United Nations passed a resolution declaring that Libya should become an independent country. On December 21, 1951, King Idris, in the town of Benghazi, declared independence for The United Kingdom of Libya. The discovery of oil in 1959 provided newfound wealth for the monarchy, but also created wealth disparity between the have and have-nots. This wealth disparity, combined with military relations with the United States and other Western countries fueled Arab nationalism.¹⁷⁹ By 1969, many people in Libya including King Idris believed that a coup was possible. The reason for this growing unrest included ineffective governance, wealth disparity, corruption caused by oil revenues, the transition from a traditional to a modern society, and the rise in nationalism following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.¹⁸⁰

In September 1969, while King Idris sought medical attention in Greece, the Free Officers Movement in Libya seized power from the acting King through a bloodless coup. The Free Officers Movement formed the Revolutionary Command Council, promoted Captain Muammar al-Qadhafi to Colonel, and gave him command of the Libyan military.¹⁸¹ Colonel Qadhafi began a relationship with the Soviet Union in exchange for military assistance and equipment.¹⁸² In the early 1970s, Qadhafi's Revolutionary Command Council, in an attempt to remove power from the previous

¹⁷⁹Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya* (Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43-45. The United States was granted access to Wheelus Airbase and al-Adem Base in return the United States by 1959 had provided \$100 million in aid to Libya.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 78.

¹⁸¹David S. Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 384.

¹⁸²U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Libya."

monarchy, expelled 20,000 Italians, closed foreign run culture centers and libraries, and removed those in positions of power in the old monarchy.¹⁸³

Muammar Qadhafi would rise in power to become the “de facto head of state” of Libya.¹⁸⁴ Qadhafi and the United States would have several run-ins during his tenure. In 1986, Libya sponsored a terrorist bombing of a West Berlin nightclub that was frequented by United States service members.¹⁸⁵ The United States struck back at the Libyan terrorists by bombing their headquarters and support facilities in Libya.¹⁸⁶ Libyan terrorist were also found responsible for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that led to United Nations sanctions in 1992. These United Nations sanctions would remain in effect until 2003. In this same year, Libya also announced that it would stop its weapons of mass destruction program, which was an important first step in diplomatic relations between Libya and the United States.¹⁸⁷

Jumping forward to 2011, the civil unrest known as the Arab Spring blew its winds across Northern Africa. In human sacrifice reminiscent of Vietnam’s Buddhist Monks self-immolation, a disheartened street vendor in Tunisia named Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire after years of police harassment. Tunisia erupted in protest

¹⁸³James Sullivan, “Libyan History And the 2011 Protests,” Finding Dulcinea, <http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/Middle-East/2011/Feb/Libyan-History.html> (accessed April 25, 2012); Vandewalle, 82.

¹⁸⁴U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes: Libya.”

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Joseph T. Stanik, *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi* (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2003), ix.

¹⁸⁷U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes: Libya.”

resulting in the exile of President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali on January 4, 2011 and with it his 23 years of control over the people. For his sacrifice that ignited the Arab Spring, *Time Magazine* named Mohamed Bouazizi the 2011 Person of the Year.¹⁸⁸ The President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, was the next leader to fall victim to the Arab Spring in January of 2011.

In January 2011, the winds of change also began to blow against the government of Libya; by February 2011, the protest grew in intensity. The arrest of a well-known human rights protester and lawyer caused an increase in protest at Benghazi. Demonstrators called for a day of protests on February 17, 2011 that spilled blood in the streets of Libya. Libyan officials limited internet access on February 18 while they increased their attacks on protesters during the next two days.¹⁸⁹ During these four days of protest, Human Rights Watch estimated that Libyan security forces killed 232 demonstrators.¹⁹⁰

By February 21, the rebel forces had gained control of Benghazi along with several other towns in the eastern portion of Libya. A day later, Qadhafi vowed to, “fight to the death rather than leave Libya.”¹⁹¹ According to the *Economist* at the time of the

¹⁸⁸Kurt Anderson, “The Protester,” *Time Magazine*, December 14, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html (accessed April 25, 2012).

¹⁸⁹Ben Smith, “Turmoil in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library, 13, <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05902.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2012).

¹⁹⁰Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Government Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings,” <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-end-unlawful-killings> (accessed April 26, 2012).

¹⁹¹Smith, 15.

protests, Qadhafi's military strength included 50,000 conscripted army personnel, 20,000 paramilitary forces and an 18,000 man Air Force with 100 MIG-25s, 15 F-1s and Soviet-era SAMs.¹⁹² With the situation in Libya worsening, President Obama issued Executive Order 13566 on February 25, which imposed economic sanctions on Qadhafi's regime.¹⁹³ On this same day, the United States closed its embassy in Libya and began evacuating their citizens.¹⁹⁴

With America already involved in two long protracted conflicts in the middle east, the American public was not in favor of getting involved in a third conflict. According to a Pew research poll conducted on March 10-13, 2011, only 13 percent of those polled favored sending American combat troops into Libya compared to 44 percent who favored a no fly zone. It is important to note that in this same survey, only 16 percent of those polled favored bombing air defenses in Libya.¹⁹⁵

On February 27, 2011, Libyan rebels announced the formation of the Transitional National Council (TNC). The goal of the TNC was to, "remove Qadhafi from power and establish a unified, democratic, and free Libya that respects universal human rights

¹⁹²*The Economist*, "Libya's No-Fly Zone the Military Balance," March 3, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18291539> (accessed May 1, 2012).

¹⁹³*Washington Post*, "United States Activities in Libya," June 15, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/united-states-activities-libya.html> (accessed May 2, 2012). The *Washington Post* has a link to this PDF document, see Scott Wilson, "Obama Administration: Libya Action Does Not Require Congressional Approval," *Washington Post*, June 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-administration-libya-action-does-not-require-congressional-approval/2011/06/15/AGLttOWH_story.html (accessed May 2, 2012).

¹⁹⁴Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 2.

¹⁹⁵Polling Report.com, "Libya," <http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm> (accessed May 3, 2012).

principles.”¹⁹⁶ Through the rest of February and the beginning of March, the situation in Libya continued to deteriorate. On March 12, the Arab League called for a no-fly zone and established communications with the TNC.¹⁹⁷

By March 17, Qadhafi’s forces were in position to crush the resistance movement that had fallen back to Benghazi. Qadhafi said to those who continue to resist, “we will come house by house, room by room. It’s over. The issue has been decided” he also said, “We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity.”¹⁹⁸ That afternoon the United Nations Security Council voted 10-0, to adopt Resolution 1973, with five member nations withholding their vote. Resolution 1973 called for an immediate cease-fire, establishment of a no fly zone and “all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”¹⁹⁹

Due to the immediate threat to civilians in Benghazi, the United States African Command initially led the enforcement of Resolution 1973 under the code name OOD. On March 19, in a race against time, French fighter aircraft attacked armored vehicles lying siege to Benghazi at 13:30 local time. That same night, coalition ships launched 112 Tomahawk land-attack missiles, while B-2 bombers attacked key airfields. With the

¹⁹⁶U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes: Libya.”

¹⁹⁷Smith, 16.

¹⁹⁸Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, “As U.N. Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role Is Unclear,” *New York Times*, March 17, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18nations.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed April 26, 2012).

¹⁹⁹United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone over Libya, Authorizing All Necessary,” <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm> (accessed April 26, 2012).

IADS threat removed, coalitions forces continued to prosecute the remaining Libyan forces surrounding Benghazi.²⁰⁰ By March 21, Qadhafi's ground forces were retreating away from Benghazi.²⁰¹ Major General Maggie Woodward, the Joint Forces Air Component said, "Within two weeks 25% of Gaddafi's military had been reduced to rubble."²⁰² On March 31, NATO assumed responsibility for enforcing Resolution 1973 under the NATO code name OUP.²⁰³

NATO, now in charge of OUP, based the use of force on three principles: "a sound legal basis, strong regional support and a demonstrated need."²⁰⁴ NATO forces enforced Resolution 1973 through a three-tier attack, focusing on an arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea, enforcing a no-fly zone and conducting strike missions to protect Libyan civilians from attack. On April 14, NATO and non-NATO members increased their support for OUP by agreeing, "to use all necessary resources to carry out the UN mandate."²⁰⁵

With the battle between the rebels and Qadhafi's forces ongoing, questions arose about the involvement of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. A *Reuter's*

²⁰⁰Anrig, 91.

²⁰¹Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 11.

²⁰²Mark Thompson, "Air Boss," *Time*, April 16, 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2063868,00.html> (accessed April 30, 2012).

²⁰³Anrig, 91.

²⁰⁴NATO, "NATO and Libya," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm (accessed April 30, 2012).

²⁰⁵*Ibid.* Also see, Claire Taylor, "Military Operations in Libya," House of Commons Library, 12, <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05909> (accessed May 4, 2012).

article published on March 29, 2011 reports that “intelligence on the rebels battling Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi has shown “flickers” of al Qaeda or Hezbollah presence.”²⁰⁶ However, the article goes on to report, that any terrorist influence was minimal and the true motivation of the rebels was to overthrow the rule Qadhafi. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, commenting on the influence of terrorists in Libya responded, “We do not have any specific information about specific individuals from any organization who are part of this, but of course, we’re still getting to know those who are leading the Transitional National Council.”²⁰⁷

On April 30, NATO missiles killed Qadhafi’s son and three of his grandsons in an apparent attack on a command and control facility in Tripoli. This attack drew harsh criticisms from Russia while NATO argued, “it was a military target, clearly linked to the Gaddafi’s regime’s systematic attacks on the civilian population.”²⁰⁸ According to Dr. Christian Anrig, as reported in *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, about a month after OUP began, NATO had “degraded Gadhafi’s military machine by one-third.”²⁰⁹ These attacks of OUP

²⁰⁶Missy Ryan and Susan Cornwell, “Intelligence on Libya rebels shows ‘flickers’ of Qaeda,” *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-libya-usa-intelligence-idUSTRE72S43P20110329> (accessed April 30, 2012).

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*

²⁰⁸Simon Denyer and Leila Fadel, “Gaddafi’s Youngest Son Killed in NATO Airstrike; Russia Condemns Attack,” *The Washington Post*, April 30, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gaddafi-calls-for-cease-fire-as-nato-strikes-tripoli/2011/04/30/AF1jZsNF_story.html (accessed May 1, 2012).

²⁰⁹Anrig, 99.

unlike OAF not only attacked fielded forces but also, “attacked operational and strategic-level headquarters.”²¹⁰

In May 2011, in an attempt to break a stalemate between TNC rebels and Qadhafi’s forces, the French and British governments each committed 12 attack helicopters to the OUP arsenal. “French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe told reporters in Brussels that the helicopters would provide more precision than fighter jets as the West enforces a United Nations mandate to protect Libyan civilians.”²¹¹

By June 2011, the Republican congress questioned the justification of President Obama to employ combat forces without congressional authorization. On June 13, 2011 House Speaker, John A. Boehner sent a letter to the President Obama warning the administration of the 60 day deadline called for under that War Power Act. The War Power Act, passed in 1973 in response to the Vietnam War, limits the power of the Executive Branch to wage war without the support of congress. The Obama administration claimed the War Power Act did not apply to Libya because, “U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops.”²¹² A former Bush administration legal advisor claimed this about Obama’s Libya theory: “The (Obama) administration’s theory

²¹⁰Ibid.

²¹¹Patrick McDonnell, “British, French attack helicopters en route to Libya,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 24, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/24/world/la-fg-libya-helicopters-20110524> (accessed May 2, 2012).

²¹²Charlie Savage and Mark Landler, “White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation,” *New York Times*, June 15, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed April 30, 2012).

implies that the president can wage war with drones and all manners of offshore missiles without having to bother with the War Powers Resolution's time limits."²¹³

Through the summer months of 2011, the rebels and forces loyal to Qadhafi were locked in a battle with neither side able to reach a decisive victory. Critics of OUP claimed that NATO lacked clear strategic goals. "The coalition partners cannot agree regarding whether the operation is intended to remove Gadhafi, to support rebel operations against Gadhafi loyalists or to simply protect civilians from attacks by Gadhafi's military forces."²¹⁴ Others claimed, "The air campaign strategy, while expedient diplomatically, was flawed from the start."²¹⁵ However, on August 21, Libyan rebels, supported by NATO airstrikes, entered the city of Tripoli thus ending Qadhafi's rule over Libya.²¹⁶ On October 20, NATO aircraft struck 11-armoured vehicles in a group of approximately 75-vehicle convoy near Sirte. Allied intelligence sources confirm that "Qadhafi was in the convoy and that the strike likely contributed to his capture."²¹⁷ Forces supporting the new TNC government captured and later killed Qadhafi. With

²¹³Ibid.

²¹⁴Robert Farley, "Over the Horizon: Libya and the Afghan Model," *World Politics Review*, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9870/over-the-horizon-libya-and-the-afghan-model-revisited> (accessed May 2, 2012).

²¹⁵Victor Kotsev, "NATO Goes Kosovo in Libya," *Asia Times*, May 25, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ME25Ak02.html (accessed May 2, 2012).

²¹⁶Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick, "Jubilant Rebels Control Much of Tripoli," *New York Times*, August 21, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/world/africa/22libya.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed May 1, 2012).

²¹⁷NATO, "NATO and Libya," http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111021_111021-oup-update.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012).

Qadhafi removed from power and the TNC in charge, NATO ended OUP on October 31, 2011.

During OUP, NATO amassed 260 air assets from 12 different countries that flew over 26,500 sorties of which more than 9,700 were strike sorties. During the operation, coalition forces destroyed 5,900 military targets including 400 pieces of artillery and 600 armored vehicles.²¹⁸ In total, OUP cost the American taxpayers an estimated \$2 billion dollars. More important than the low monetary cost of OUP is the fact that no United States service members were killed during combat operations.²¹⁹ While the fate of Libya is still in question today, OUP was by many accounts a successful operation for NATO and the United States.

This research will now look at the lessons learned from OOD, OUP and the potential of OUP becoming the new model for America policy makers. The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis provides three important lessons learned from the short-lived OOD that are applicable to this research. First, forming a coalition comprised of 15 nations, including NATO and Arab League Nations required significant amounts of time and planning resources. Next, the lack of boots on the ground hampered intelligence gathering, battle damage assessment and information operations. The third lesson learned was that national caveats and rules of engagements affected the conduct of operations.

²¹⁸NATO, "Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats," http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf (accessed May 2, 2012). Also see Taylor, 15-16.

²¹⁹Jessica Rettig, "End of NATO's Libya Intervention Means Financial Relief For Allies," *U.S. News*, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/10/31/end-of-natos-libya-intervention-means-financial-relief-for-allies> (accessed May 2, 2012).

For example, some nations would only conduct strike sorties if the Qadhafi's forces were moving towards rebel positions.²²⁰

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen sees the Libyan operation as a "template for future NATO missions and proof that the United Nations can outsource its muscle to the alliance, but still insists that NATO's core mission is to protect its member's nations."²²¹ The Secretary General also notes that Libya was a new model for NATO because the United States "took a relative back seat, unlike NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo."²²² For example, the United States launched 99 percent of the Tomahawk cruise missiles, provided the majority of surveillance, refueling and targeting capabilities, but only conducted 26 percent of the sorties.²²³

Dr. Anrig, deputy director of doctrine research and education for the Swiss Air Force claims this about OUP: "The Libyan campaign stands as a successful example of how Western air power shifted the balance in favor of a resistance movement against superior armed regime forces. Essentially, it leveled the playing field."²²⁴ Retired United States Air Force General David Deptula had this to say about effectiveness of OUP in supporting rebel forces against Libyan conventional forces: "In other words, modern air power eliminated the effectiveness of the Libyan army and provided the weakly

²²⁰Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 11.

²²¹Eric Westervelt, "NATO's Intervention in Libya: A New Model," NPR Find a Station, <http://www.npr.org/2011/09/12/140292920/natos-intervention-in-libya-a-new-model> (accessed September 27, 2011).

²²²Ibid.

²²³Ibid.

²²⁴Anrig, 104.

organized and poorly equipped Kadhafi opponents the ability to defeat his loyalists' army."²²⁵

Dr. Biddle, a Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, balances the argument against OUP being a model for future United States military operations: "The problem remains that warfare rarely allows big payoffs from small investments."²²⁶ Dr. Biddle goes on to say that, "Western air power can easily annihilate Moammar Gaddafi's modest air force and prevent him from using massed armor and artillery in the open. But, once the dictator's forces move into populated areas and resort to fighting among the civilian populations, the utility of air power diminishes rapidly."²²⁷ Others may argue not to draw too much from OUP's success because of its small size. General James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe along with Ivo Daalder, the United States representative to NATO, caution that because OUP was "about one-fifth the size of that in Kosovo in terms of numbers of military assets involved" that NATO may not be able to replicate its success again in the era of declining defense spending.²²⁸

Amitai Etzioni, in an article published in the *Military Review* cautions against the "tendency of humanitarian missions (which set out to protect civilians) to turn into

²²⁵Vanguard, "Libya War Gives Us Air Power Advocates A Lift," <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/10/libya-war-gives-us-air-power-advocates-a-lift/> (accessed May 2, 2012).

²²⁶Stephen Biddle, "The Libya Dilemma: The Limits of Air," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-libya-dilemma-the-limits-of-air-power/2011/03/25/AFfTVUYB_story.html (accessed May 2, 2012).

²²⁷*Ibid.*

²²⁸Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, "Nato's Victory in Libya," *Foreign Affaris*, February 2, 2012, http://nato.usmission.gov/foreign_affairs_02_02_13.html (accessed May 2, 2012).

missions that seek forced regime change, lead to much higher levels of casualties, and tend to fail.”²²⁹ Mr. Etzioni, also cautions that a regime change does not necessarily equate to a democratic government. With this being said, the jury is still out on the fate of Libya and their newfound independence. History will ultimately be the judge of the success or failure of OOD and OUP, but at least for now it appears to be a successful application of policy by other means.

²²⁹Amitai Etzioni, “The Lessons of Libya,” *Review of Military Literature* 92, no. 1 (January-February 2012): 45-54.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Throughout America's history, the people, their government and the military have witnessed many debates about the application of military power to achieve national policy objectives. These debates will surely continue as long as America remains to be a democracy. The great Prussian, Carl Von Clausewitz, taught us that war is an extension of policy by other means. With this in mind, this research explored three case studies on the use of air power to achieve national policy objectives. These case studies cover an air war in Kosovo, the use of air power, SOF and host nation forces in Afghanistan, and the use of air power with a proxy force in Libya. The purpose of these three case studies was to answer the research question of; does OUP provide a template for how the United States will settle the preponderance of future military operations?

This research has shown that OUP, the Afghan model and the lessons learned in Kosovo do provide a model for American policy makers to achieve national objectives by other means. This research has combined the lessons learned from the three operations and titled it the Limited Boots on Ground (LBoG) model. This chapter will explain the three requirements for the LBoG model to be successful in future military operations. National policy makers can use these requirements as a checklist for future military applications. This chapter will also explore the four disadvantages of the LBOG model, followed by four advantages. This chapter will conclude with this author's recommendation for future implications.

The first key condition for the LBoG model to work is the support of the local host nation population. This support needs to include an element of civil unrest combined with nationalism. For example, in Libya, the local population was willing to rise up. The rebels based in Benghazi, supported by Western firepower, were able to overcome Qadhafi's superior military and security forces. In Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance provided a proxy force, that when supported by air power and SOF was able to overthrow the much larger and stronger Taliban Army and government. In Kosovo, a 78-day air campaign, along with the threat of a ground invasion, forced Milosevic to remove his forces from Kosovo. While there was limited cooperation between NATO and the KLA, the KLA did introduce a popular civil uprising.

The next key condition for the LBoG model is the support of a broad based coalition. While it may not be possible to get all nations on board with our national policy objectives, we need to get as many as possible. The request of the Arab League to impose a no-fly zone provided the Arab legitimacy that is important when dealing with a Muslim nation. With the coalition in place, the United States does not have to be the lead nation. In Libya, the United States initially provided a leading role, but quickly turned control of the operations over to NATO; then the United States took a supporting role in the coalition instead of a leading role. In Kosovo, NATO provided the coalition of the willing. In fact, in OAF, coalition solitary was the friendly center of gravity.

The final condition to consider for the LBoG model is the accessibility to bring overwhelming firepower to those forces we are supporting. This can be broken down into two parts; the first is the ability to gain and maintain access to the area. In Kosovo, the older Russian IADS threat forced NATO warplanes to fly above 15,000 feet, which

complicated the targeting of dispersed fielded forces. In the land locked country of Afghanistan the over-flight rights granted by Pakistan was critical to the success of the Afghan Model there. The next requirement is the ability to target the enemy's key critical vulnerability with limited or no coalition forces on the ground. For example, in Kosovo, the decision to target field forces was not as effective as going after the strategic targets in Belgrade. In Afghanistan, the combination of SOF and the Northern Alliance proved to be a lethal combination for the Taliban forces. In Libya, the fluid battle lines proved difficult for NATO warplanes to distinguish between friend and foe.

While the LBoG is a model for policy makers, it is not without limitations. The first limitation is the quality of the proxy forces. The LBoG will not work against first rate military forces. While successfully used in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya the LBoG model has not been proven against a near peer competitor. Policy makers and military planners must carefully evaluate the enemy's military strength and their desire to kill their fellow citizens in defense of their governments rule.

The next disadvantage of LBoG model is the true motivation of the proxy force. In countries where century old ethnic and tribal disputes exist, policy makers may not know the true motivation of those they are supporting. In Afghanistan, many Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters escaped into Pakistan through the blocking operations of the anti-Taliban fighters. In Libya, there were reports of al-Qaeda elements in the rebel forces fighting against Qadhafi's forces.

The third disadvantage of LBoG is the amount of time these operations can take. NATO's air operations in Kosovo lasted 78-days before Milosevic finally agreed to remove his forces from Kosovo. The fall of the Taliban required about the same amount

of time. In Libya, it took 235 days from the start of OOD to the end of OUP. The application of a ground invasion force would decrease the amount of time required to reach the desired end state. For example, one of the big lessons learned from OAF is the lack of credible ground threat significantly reduced NATO's capability to destroy fielded forces.

The last limitation of the LBoG model is the inability to provide stability operations following major combat operations. In Afghanistan, the limited amount of boots on the ground in the years after the 2001 invasion provided a power vacuum that the Taliban later filled. While the history books are still being written about Libya, one of the critiques is the lack of nation building by follow on security forces. This allows a potential power vacuum for the enemies of America to fill.

While LBoG is not a model for every conflict, this researcher believes that when correctly employed the benefits outweigh the disadvantages. The first advantage is that LBoG puts a familiar face on those who are doing the fighting. The sight of conventional American forces in the eyes of the host nation has a nationalist effect. This nationalist effect causes a temporary amnesia of age-old tribal conflicts to be forgotten in favor of fighting the imperialist American invaders. Another advantage of using host nation forces is the benefit of fighting on what is essentially a home field advantage. Local forces know the terrain, understand the culture and customs, and speak the language. When local forces team up with SOF and precision firepower, they become a lethal combination.

The use of LBoG model avoids the Pottery Barn effect of "you break you buy it" experience. America's experiences in Vietnam and Iraq have shown us that it is easier to get into war than to get out of it. The difficulties with nation building are a hard lesson

learned, or some would say relearned by the United States over the past decade.

However, the use of host nation forces to liberate themselves puts a local face not only on the victory but also on the follow on responsibility to provide services for the people of the government they just removed.

Another benefit of LBoG is the ability of air power, from land and sea, to mass large amounts of firepower in a relatively short period of time. For example, American bombs and missiles were falling in Afghanistan only 26 days after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Compare this to the months needed to amass a large ground invasion force and the benefits become obvious. In Libya, NATO warplanes were attacking Qadhafi's forces within 48 hours after the United Nations passed resolution 1973 authorizing the use of force.

The last benefit of the LBoG model is actually two fold. First, the cost savings of not deploying large amounts of ground personnel is astonishing. The cost to American taxpayers for OOD and OUP was less than \$2 billion dollars. The total American cost of this operation was less than one week of combat operations in Iraq during 2007. The small price tag of the LBoG operations will become even more important in years of declining defense spending. This researcher believes that our national debt is the greatest present day threat to our country. While the cost saving is significant, even more important is the limited loss of American most valued treasures, their military service members.

Second, the small price tag and minimal amounts of casualties will gain and maintain the public support longer than a long protracted conflict with high casualties and even higher prices. In future operations where American or the coalition's public opinion

is the strategic center of gravity, the LBoG model will protect that vulnerability better than large amounts of boots on the ground. In addition, the precedent has been set that the War Powers Act does not apply to the LBoG model; this allows national policy makers the ability to conduct military operations without the sometimes-difficult approval process from congress.

Finally, in the history of warfare why is the LBoG model possible now? This author will argue that technology has changed the nature of the modern battlefield. PGM allow pinpoint strikes that have changed the battlefield calculus. For example, in Afghanistan, Northern Alliance forces with SOF and air power defeated a numerically superior enemy. Therefore, the side that possesses air superiority and PGM proves that the defense is no longer the stronger form of war. Interior lines are no longer an advantage they actually become a disadvantage when one possess air superiority and PGM. Another technological advancement is satellite communication and machine-to-machine interface. These advancements have shortened the kill chain from days to minutes. The last advantage that allows the LBoG model to work is the advances in surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The ability to access near real time intelligence from persistent space and aircraft platforms allows targeting that was not available in the past.

Recommendations

This author provided three recommendations for the policy makers of both the government and military. First, policy makers should strongly consider the LBoG model when deciding to employ the military instrument of national power. The LBoG model, if done correctly, provides the firepower to force our will onto others without the risk of a

quagmire of boots on the ground. Next, the advancements in stealth technology, persistent reconnaissance and surveillance assets, and PGM all provide the elements to make the LBoG model work. Our adversaries will surely find ways to negate these capability gaps. Therefore, we must continue to invest in these technologies to maintain our advantage. Finally, the LBoG model is not a one size fits all solution to national defense. There will continue to be a requirement for a balanced conventional ground force to deal with near peer enemies of America; however, these forces should only be used if the LBoG has failed or is not able to achieve America's national policy objectives by other means.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Bacevich, Andrew J., and Eliot A. Cohen, eds. *War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Briscoe, Charles, Richard Kiper, James Schroder, and Kalev Sepp. *Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003.
- Clark, Wesley K. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002.
- Collins, Joseph. *Understanding War in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
- Department of the Army. *Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004.
- Doder, Dusko, and Louise Branson. *Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant*. New York: Free Press, 1999.
- Hosmer, Stephen T. *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2001.
- Jones, Seth G. *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2009.
- Judah, Tim. *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
- Lambeth, Benjamin S. *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2005.
- . *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: a Strategic and Operational Assessment*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001.
- Larson, Eric V., and Bogdan Savych. *American Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2005.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: a Short History*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999.

- Martel, William C. *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Libya: a Country Study*, 4th ed. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989.
- O'Ballance, Edgar. *Afghan Wars*. Rev. ed. Herndon, VA: Brassey's UK, 2003.
- Perry, Walter L., Bruce Nardulli, Bruce R. Pirni, John Gordon, and John G. McGinn. *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002.
- Sell, Louis. *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2002.
- Stanik, Joseph T. *El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi*. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2003.
- Tanner, Stephen. *Afghanistan: a Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002.
- Vandewalle, Dirk. *A History of Modern Libya*. Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005.

Periodicals

- Anderson, Kurt. "The Protester." *Time Magazine*, December 14, 2011. http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html (accessed April 25, 2012).
- Andres, Richard, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith. "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model." *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 1-49.
- Anrig, Christian. "Allied Air Power Over Libya." *Air and Space Power Journal* (Winter 2011): 89-109. http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-1/2012_1_02_anrig_s_eng.pdf (accessed April 26, 2012).
- Daalder, Ivo, and James Stavridis. "Nato's Victory in Libya." *Foreign Affairs*, February 2, 2012. http://nato.usmission.gov/foreign_affairs_02_02_13.html (accessed May 2, 2012).
- Etzioni, Amitai. "The Lessons of Libya." *Review of Military Literature* 92, no. 1 (January-February 2012): 45-54.

- Hagan, William. "The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July 1999).
- Karon, Tony. "Rebels: Mazar-i-sharif is Ours." *Time*, November 9, 2001. <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,183885,00.html> (accessed April 2, 2012).
- Kitfield, James. "Another Look at the Air War That Was." *Air Force Magazine*, October 1999. <http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1999/October%201999/1099airwar.aspx> (accessed January 6, 2012).
- Naylor, Sean. "The 'Afghan Model': War's future?" *Army Times*, November 18, 2002. [http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iwsearch/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=NewsBank&p_text_direct0=document_id=\(%20101AD3F5B0751590%20\)&p_docid=101AD3F5B0751590&p_theme=aggdocs&p_queryname101AD3F5B0751590&f_openurl=y](http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iwsearch/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=YMD_date:D&p_product=NewsBank&p_text_direct0=document_id=(%20101AD3F5B0751590%20)&p_docid=101AD3F5B0751590&p_theme=aggdocs&p_queryname101AD3F5B0751590&f_openurl=y) (accessed April 8, 2012).
- Thompson, Mark. "Air Boss." *Time*, April 16, 2011. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2063868,00.html> (accessed April 30, 2012).
- Tirpak, John. "Washington Watch: Lessons Learned and Re-Learned." *Air Force Magazine*, August 1999. <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1999/August%201999/0899watch.aspx> (accessed February 5, 2012).

Government Documents

- NATO. "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo." <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B> (accessed January 16, 2012).
- . "NATO and Libya." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm (accessed April 30, 2012).
- . "NATO and Libya." http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111021_111021-oup-update.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012).
- . "Operation Allied Force." <http://www.defense.gov/specials/kosovo/> (accessed January 16, 2012).
- . "Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats." http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf (accessed May 2, 2012).
- Smith, Ben. "Turmoil in the Middle East." House of Commons Library. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05902.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2012).

- U.S. Department of Defense. "Defense New Casualty Report." <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2012).
- U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Afghanistan." <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm> (accessed March 7, 2012).
- . "Background Notes: Libya." <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm> (accessed April 18, 2012).
- Woehrel, Steven. "Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current." CRS Report to Congress, June 3, 1999. <http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RS20213.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2012).
- Other Sources
- Air Force Historical Studies Office. "1999-Operation Allied Force." <http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18652> (accessed January 16, 2012).
- CNN.com. "Official: Marines on Ground in Southern Afghanistan." http://articles.cnn.com/2001-11-26/us/gen.war.against.terror_1_mazar-e-26th-marine-expeditionary-units-kandahar?_s=PM:US (accessed April 2, 2012).
- . "Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan." http://articles.cnn.com/2003-05-01/world/afghan.combat_1_provincial-reconstruction-teams-afghanistan-afghan-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:asiapcf (accessed April 8, 2012).
- Human Rights Watch. "Libya: Government Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings." <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-end-unlawful-killings> (accessed April 26, 2012).
- Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis. "Libya Operation Odyssey Dawn Executive Summary." <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/409019> (accessed May 3, 2012).
- Judah, Tim. "History, Bloody History." *BBC News*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo/110492.stm (accessed December 3, 2011).
- Polling Report.com. "Libya." <http://www.pollingreport.com/libya.htm> (accessed May 3, 2012).
- Ryan, Missy, and Susan Cornwell. "Intelligence on Libya rebels shows 'flickers' of Qaeda." *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-libya-usa-intelligence-idUSTRE72S43P20110329> (accessed April 30, 2012).
- .Smith, Ben. "Turmoil in the Middle East." *House of Commons Library*, 28 March 2011.

- Sullivan, James. "Libyan History and the 2011 Protests." Finding Dulcinea.
<http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/Middle-East/2011/Feb/Libyan-History.html> (accessed April 25, 2012).
- Taylor, Claire. "Military Operations in Libya." House of Commons Library.
<http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05909> (accessed May 4, 2012).
- The American President Project. "William J. Clinton: The President's News Conference."
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=57458#axzz1tBGhQZSR>
(accessed April 26, 2012).
- Vanguard. "Libya War Gives Us Air Power Advocates a Lift." <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/10/libya-war-gives-us-air-power-advocates-a-lift/> (accessed May 2, 2012).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Timothy R. Hentschel
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. David P. Goebel
Department of Army Tactics
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Lt Col Randy A. Nash
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301